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The main finding of the study is that the domestic financial
market plays a very significant role in the success or failure of
trade liberalization. This was found to be the case in Sri Lanka
during 1977-87.
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Athukorala and Rajapatirana developed a  have increased private savings in financial
framework for analyzing the relationship be-  institutions, raised economywide financial
tween domestic financial markets and the effects  intermediation ratios, and expanded credit to the
of trade liberalization and applied it to Sri  private sector.
Lanka's experience between 1977 and 1987.
They found that the domestic financial market  More important, Athukorala and
siirniricantly affects the outcome of trade liberal-  Rajapatirana find a statistically significant
ization.  relationship between the financial intermediation
ratio and the real exchange rate.
Because Sri Lanka deregulated its interest
rates when it undertook the trade liberalization,  Credit to the private sector had increased
this allowed those eaming more from trade  after reform of the financial sector, but its
liberalization to hold financial assets rather than  reallocation was inhibited by large fiscal deficits,
nontradables.  The availability of savings and  inconsistent monetary policies, and increased
time deposits at attractive interest rates prevented  intervention in the financial market.  Through
the premature appreciation of the exchange rate,  their negative effect on the real exchange rate,
thus helping to maintain the competitiveness  these interventions offset some of the gains in
stimulated by trade liberalization.  By reforming  competitiveness achieved through trade liberal-
interest rates, removing credit ceilings, and  ization.
increasing competition among banks, Sri Lanka
helped increase private sector savings - which  Athukorala and Rajapatirana find no evi-
could be reallocated to the tradable sector.  dence of financial crowding out in Sri Lanka.
Unlike earlier studies on financial reform in
Sri Lanka, this one finds that financial reforms
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1.  Introduction
A sizable  body  of literature  on the  relationship  between  trade  and
development  has appeared  over  the  past  two  decades  and  has  demonstrated
that  establishing  a liberal  trade  regime  is superior  to  a restrictive  trade
regime  in  achieving  development  objectives.  This  has led  to a second  wave
of literature  on trade  liberalization--that  is,  on the  issues  involved  in  a
shift  away from  a controlled  (and  hence,  distorted)  trade  regime  toward  a
more liberal  one.
One such  issue  is the  complementarity  between  trade  reform  and the
operations  of domestic  financial  markets.  "Financial  repression,"  meaning
policy  distortions  that  interfere  with efficient  domestic  financial
markets,  is  just  as common  in developing  countries  as policy  distortions  of
the  foreign  traie  regime. For  many of these  countries,  "the  liberalization
of the foreign  trade  and  financial  sectors  can  be considered  as two  aspects
of the  same  problem"  (McKinnon  1981:366). An unawareness  of this
complementarity  may be one  reason  why  many  countries  have  opted  for trade
liberalization  while  continuing  to intervene  in the  operations  of their
domestic  financial  markets.
The  present  study  has two  objectives.  First,  it  presents  a framework
for  analyzing  the  impact  of the  domestic  financial  environment  on trade
reform. Second,  using  this  analytical  framework,  it  examines  the role  of
the  domestic  financial  market  in determining  the  fate  of trade  policy
reforms  initiated  in Sri  Lanka  in 1977. Although  generalizing  from  a
single  case  has its  pitfalls,  the  insight  gained  from  the  study  may be
useful  to policymakers  in other  countries  in identifying  critical  issues
that  may crop  up in the  process  of designing  and implementing  similar
policy  reforms.
Sri  Lanka  was chosen  to explore  the  hypothesized  relationships  because
of both  the  nature  of the  reforms  carried  out  there  and  the  controversy
surrounding  the  extent  to  which  financial  market  reform  contribute  to the
sustainability  of trade  reform. Some  authors  argue  that  the  half-hearted
nature  of financial  reform  in Sri  Lanka,  combined  with  macroeconomic
instability,  was a  major  factor  in reversing  the  1977  policy  of trade
liberalization.  (Lal  and  Rajapatirana,  1989;  Hiemenz  and  Langhammer,
1989). Other  authors  (e.g.,  Jayawardena  et al.,  1987;  Roe,  1982)  have
pointed  to the  Sri  Lankan  experience  as an illustration  of the  harmful
long-run  consequences  of setting  interest  rates  "too  high."  In light  of
what happened  during  the  first  two  post-reform  years,  for  instance.  Roe
(1982,  p. 218)  argued  that
the  high interest  rate  provides  a useful  anti-
inflationary  check  in the  short  run  and  helps  to
moderate  the  speculative  influences  which  could
otherwise  have been  stimulated  by Sri  Lanka's  trade
liberalization.  However,  it is  not  a policy  that  should
be looked  to for  significant  long-term  benefits. There
is little  evidence  that  the  high interest  rates  are
contributing  to  an improved  allocation  of capital  funds.2
Coats and Khatkhate  (1984)  and  Khatkhate  (1988)  consider  Roe's  analysis
to be a  'quite  convincing"  demonstration  that  freeing  interest  rates
without regard  for Lhe  real rate  of return  on investment  may jeopardize  the
complementary  relationship  between financial  asset  accumulation  and capital
formation.
This  study  confines  itself  to the relationship  between  the  domestic
financial  market  and trade reform.  In  other  words, it  does  not deal  with
the relationship  between  the capital  account  in the  balance  of payments  and
the trade  liberalization. This latter  iss-te  has been extensively  studied
in recent  years,  and a consensus  seems  to  have emerged  that  liberalization
of the  current  account  in the  balance  of  payn,ents  should  precede
liberalization  of the capital  account  in  mos# circumstances  (e.g.,  Corbo,
1987;  Edwards  and Edwards,  1987;  Frenkel,  1982;  McKinnon,  1982).
Following  established  practice,  the  term 'trade  liberalization"  as used
here  means "the  process  of removing,  or reducing,  the implicit  premiums
associated  with quantitative  restrictions  (including  rationing  in the case
of price controls)  that prevent  individuals  from  carrying  out the
transactions  they  wish to undertake  at prevailing  (world  market) prices"
(Krueger,  1985; see  also  Michaely  et al.,  forthcoming;  Choksi and
Papageorgiou  1985).  The term "financial  liberalization"  refers  to any
action  to remove  or reduce  "financial  repression"  or "financial
restriction." Financial  repression  occurs  when the government  orders
interest  rates  to  be set  at rates  well below  those  needed  to balance  the
supply  of financial  savings  with investment  demand.  Financial  restriction
occurs  when explicit  or implicit  taxes (e.g.,  high reserve  requirements,
compulsory  purchases  of government  securities,  deposit  taxes,  prohibitions
on lending  to certain  types  of businesses,  forced  lending  to  bad risks)
force  banks to  maintain  a wide wedge  between  lending  and borrowing,  even if
they  are allowed  to charge  market rates  (McKinnon,  1973;  Shaw,  1973;  Fry,
1988).
The rest  of this  paper is structured  in the following  manner.  Section
2 surveys  existing  theory  on how domestic  financial  market conditions
affect  the  outcome  of trade  liberalization  and delineates  testable
hypotheses.  Section  3 outlines  economic  performance  and financial
development  in  the  pre-reform  Sri Lankan  economy  and  describes  the  key
elements  of the 1977  trade  policy  reform.  Section  4 attempts  to sort  out
the  ways in  which financial  market  conditions  affected  Sri  Lanka's  economic
adjustment  following  the trade  liberalization. The implications  of  various
policy  initiatives  in the financial  arena  as  well as  distortions  which  were
left  untouched  in the  process  are analyzed  in light  of the  earlier
theoretical  postulates. The final  section  gives  a summary  and the
conclusions  of the study.
2.  Central  Relationships
The object  of trade  liberalization  is to realize  gains  that can  be made
from  a better  allocation  of domestic  resources. In  particular,  the
restructuring  of incentives  under trade  liberalization  is  done in  the
belief  that total  factor  productivity  will be improved  by eliminating
discrimination  against  exports  and efficient  import  substituting
activities,  reducing  the  variance  in  production  incentives  across3
industries,  and encouraging  a better  allocation  of resources  to tradables.
In  coordination  with trade liberalization,  reform  of domestic  financial
markets  can play a crucial  role  on both the demand  and supply  sides.  The
demand  side  complementarity  of the financial  market involves  appropriate
adjustment  of the real  exchange  rate (the  relative  price of traded  to
nontraded  goods) following  a trade  liberalization. On the supply  side, the
domestic  finance  market influences  factor  mobility through  its  impact  on
both the  volume  and allocation  of credit.
2.1 Demand  Side  Complementarity
The relative  price  adjustments  which occur  in an economy  following
trade  liberalization  can be expected  to bring  about  a dep-:eciation  in the
real  exchange  rate, thus  encouraging  a shift  of resources  to the  production
of tradables. Sustaining  (and  improving  upon)  this  greater  price
competitiveness  is  necessary  if the  gains from  liberalizat.on  are to be
permanent.
Liberalization,  however,  usually  will have favorable  output  and
employment  effects  which  may cause the real  exchange  rate to  appreciate,
thus  counteracting  the  main goal  of liberalization. That is, favorable
expectations  about income  growth  may be translated  into  greater  perceived
wealth,  and greater  perceived  wealth  may in turn  be reflected  in increased
consumption  if  households  change  their savings  levels  with a view to
achieving  desired  wealth targets  in  Metzlerian  fashion.  The level  of
investment  may also increase,  since  liberalization  generally  raises  the
real  return  on investment. In the typical  situation,  this increase  in
aggregate  demand  will cause  a deterioratiorn  of the  current  account  and  an
appreciation  in the real  exchange  rate. 1
A  rise in  domestic  int.rest  rates  towa.d  market  clearing  levels,  when
it is  one part of a financial  reform  package,  may be an effective  means of
preventing  premature  appreciation  of the exchange  rate (McKinnon,  1973;
Kapur,  1986).2  An increase  in interest  rates  raises  the  demand for
interest-bearing  bank deposits  and reduces  domestic  nontradable  prices  for
a given  rate  of money expansion  ano inherited  set of inflationary
expectations. A rise  in domestic  interest  rates  has the  added  advantage
that  it  will produce  an immediate  increase  in the  volume  of bank credit  and
thus  may facilitate  supply  side  adjustments. The  use of contractionary
monetaty  policy as an alternative  strategy  for  preventing  a premature
appreciation  of the  exchange  rate  may produce  contractionary  supply  side
1.  Under the  usual  assumption  that tradables  and  nontradables  are  both
normal  goods,  a rise  in aggregate  demand  raises  the demand  for  both
types  of goods.  Since  the economy  is  a pricetaker  in  the  world  market.
the increase  in demand  for tradables  is simplv  reflected  as a trade
deficit  without generating  any  price rise.  By  contrast.  increased
demand  for nontradables  push ul)  their prices  as the supply  is not
perfectly  elastic.
2.  Here we of course  assume  that cortrcls  or the capital  account  are not
relaxed.4
-ffects,  given  that  business  firms  depend  heavily  on bank credit  for
working  capital.
Interest  rate reform  may also  have a favorable  impact  on the real
exchange  rate through  its impact  on the  composition  of asset  portfolios.
In  most developing  countries,  the  typical  saver's (investor's)  portfolio  is
composed  mainly of direct  financial  claims (cash  and bank deposits)  and
physical  assets (mostly  real  estate  and related  nontradables,  and consumer
durables).  The  market for indirect  financial  claims (such  as bonds,  common
stocks,  mortgages,  commercial  bills) is insignificant  in  most small  country
economies. Thus, if the financial  regime  remains  repressed,  the impact  of
an increase  in income  generated  by trade  liberalization  will lead to
stronger  demand  for  physical  assets,  part4cularly  nontradables. Real
estate is  a typ.lcal  nontradable  asset.  Since  property  is in fixed  supply,
total  holdings  of financial  assets  and  property  are not altered  by
purchases  of nontradables. The enhanced  demand  for  physical  assets  will
only stop  when the  price of property  rises  high enough  to  deter further
purchases (Bevan  et al., 1987).  The outcome  of this  proc ss  will be an
appreciation  in the real  exchange  rate  which reduce  the incentive  to
increase  production  of tradables.
2.2 Supply  Side  Complementarity
The typical  pre-liberalization  economy  is  one in  which a variety  of
domestic  markets,  as well as the foreign  trade  regime,  are subject  to
controls.  As  well as incurring  significant  econ'mic  costs individually,
these  controls  interact  with one  another  in a synergistic  fashion  to
magnify  their total  cost to the economy (Krueger,  1984).  In such  a
context,  the  manner in  which the  economy  reacts  to trade  liberalization
depends  on  what happens in related  markets.  Government  control  of these
markets  may severely  constrain  factor  mobility,  both by limiting  the volume
of credit  and preventing  its efficient  allocation,  thus  reducing  the
intended  benefits  of trade liberalization.
A well-known  feature  of a repressed  financial  regime  is the  maintenance
of real incerest  rates  which are  much less  than  the sum  of the real rate  of
return  on capital  and the real  resource  costs  of financial  intermediation.
Consequently,  financial  deepening  is reduced,  leading  to  a shrinking  in the
volume (f  institutional  credit.  This  problem  may be compounded  if the
government  siphons  away  an increased  proportion  of institutional  credit  to
finance  its own investments. If that  happens,  the  quality  of the  nation's
investment  portfolio  and the capacity  of the  economy  to generate  surpluses
may be compromised.  The value of financial  liberalization  is that  it
augments  the availability  of investable  funds,  particularly  for the private
sector, and thereby  facilitates  investment  in the tradable  sectors
foll.,wing  trade liberalization.3 In  a  reoresqed  financial  regime. and
owing  to the resulting  excess  demand  for institutional  credit. credit  is
usuallv  rationEd on the basis of criteria  unrelated  to economic
feasiibilitv.  r,reJit  rationing  usually means making  room  in credit  queues
for projects  that would  automatically  be disqualified  if an equilibrium
3.  It is generally  the case  that tradable  sectors  in most  developing
(ountries  are dominated  by the private  sector.5
interest  rate  prevaileci.  The invariable  outcome  is the  allocation  of some
of the  available  credit f)r  suboptimal  projects  while a larger  number  of
high-return  projects  are denied  credit.
There is another  relationship  between  trade  liberalization  and the
financial,  markets  that should  be noted.  One of the  purposes  of trade
liberalization  is to raise  the return  on investments  in the tradable
sector. However,  the sectors  or firms  to  which the  government  channels
credit  are not  necessarily  associated  with trade  strategy  priorities.
Moreover,  the cost  of borrowing  in  a financially  repressed  economy  can
differ  from sector  to sector  and  may do so in a way that reduces  the
efficiency  of resource  allocation. Consequently,  if the financial  market
is  repressed,  the  anticipated  reallocation  of resources  that  should  follow
trade liberalization  may not take  place  or may take place  in a less
effective  way.
There are two  ways in  which a controlled  financial  reg.me  can thwart
the  employment  and income  distribution  effects  of trade liP  eralization.
Credit rationing  at artificially  low interest  rates,  together  with real
exchange  rate  overvaluation  and the  preferential  treatment  accorded  to
capital  goods imports  in a controlled  trade  regime,  encourages  capital-
intensive  activities  at the expense  of labor-intensive  activities  (Krueger
1983).  Furthermore,  credit  rationing  may squeeze  out small  borrowers  who
cannot  pay the  high costs  of obtaining  information,  who lack  adequate
collateral,  or  who are  not likely  to achieve  economies  scale.  Small
borrowers  may also  be denied  credit  because  of the  natural  inclination  of
commercial  private  banks to favor  only  the largest  and safest  borrowers.
(Gonzalez-Vega,  1984  and 1985).  Reducing  or eliminating  credit rationing
can therefore  be expected  to improve  employment  prospects  and income
distribution,  since  labor-intensive  activity  wiil  benefit  and  a  larger
number  of borrowers  will have access  to formal  cr
2.3 Some  Qualifications
The hypotheses  above  focus  only  on the  operations  of che  organized
(formal) money market  (OMM).  In most  developing  countries,  however,  there
is also  an active  but  unorganized  money  market (UMM)  often  referred  to as
the "curb  market"  or "informal  market."  The  volume  of the  lending
transacted  on this market  may be at least as great as, and perhaps many
times greater than, that  of the OMM.4  Because of this, it has been argued
that  "financial  liberalization  is an exceedinglv  chancy proposition"  in
terms of whether  it will  produce financ:al  deepening  (Buffie. 1984:318,  see
also  van Wijnbergen,  1982 and 1983: Buf'ie.  1984: Taylor.  1983: andl
Edwards,  1988).  Claims  in the informal market  may be an important
alternative  to holding  transaction  balances  '-ashi  and time deposits  with
commercial  banks.  These  claims are me-t  l; in ehp  form  of dire-t borrnwinp
by  households  and  thus  can  be  termed  "1Q0 percent intermediation.'
By contrast.  reserve  requirements  constituta  a leakage  in the financial
intermediation  done  through fommercial  banks.  ecB(-ause  of offi-ial  roservP
4.  Ghate  (1988) provides  a comprehensive  suiv-., f the literature  on thi-
phenomenon.6
requirements, bank lending based on household deposits implies a "(l-a) 100
percent intermediation"  where "a"  is the reserve deposit ratio.)  Given
this difference, so the argument goes, financial liberalization may reduce
the overall degree of financial intermediation of the economy, provided
bank deposits are better substitutes for UMM claims than for cash.  Van
Wijnbergen (1982)  and Edwards (1988)  have provided empirical support for
this hypothesis (now  popularly known as the "financial crowding-out
hypothesis"), using data from South Korea (henceforth,  Korea).
The analytical value of this hypothesis for developing countries as a
whole is yet to be established, however.  The evidence of other authors
(Little  et al., 1987; Ghate, 1988; Fernando, 1988), in fact, suggests that
any generalizations based on the Korean experience may be misleading.  In
Korea, "the  UMM is largely an urban phenomenon" (van  Wijnbergen 1982:124)
and is "intertwined closely with the banking system, as funds raised by
dealers in that market often pass through the banking system" (Kim
1986:151).  It is therefore not unrealistic to treat UMM claims and
commercial bank deposits as close substitutes.  In other developing
countries (except  perhaps in Taiwan (Koshaka, 1984)), there is no such
thing as "the informal credit market."  Rather, there are many informal
credit markets (distinguished  by such factors as geographic location, type
of lerder, and industry or service being financed)  which operate
independently of each other and  with no links to the banking system.  A
significant portion of iaiformal  lending takes the form of noninterest-
bearing loans made on the basis of kinship, friendship, or patron/client
relationships.  And, given the high risk involved in the informal markets,
most interest-bearing loans are made at rates that may be 5 to 10 times
higher than market rates.  Moreover, surveys suggest that resorting to the
informal markets for investment and working capital is not typical of
entrepreneurs in most countries, however common it may be in Korea (Little
et al., 1987).  It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that financial
market reform is not likely to trigger a significant shift of funds from
the informal to the formal  market.
Another objection to the crowding out argument is that it assumes that
a choicc is  made by borrowers on the basis of monetary assets (cash,  bank
deposits, informal  market claims) alone.  Thus, the possibility of
substitution of physical assets for financial assets, strongly emphasized
by certain investigators (McKinnon, 1973: Galbis, 1977) is ignored.  Given
the nature of household asset holding behavior in develoning countries,
this substitution process may be of crucial importance in determining the
outcome of financial market reform.
An increase in the volume of OMM transactions, even if it involves
considerable crowding out of UTMI  activities. may be desirable on efficiency
grounds.  That is, a given quantitv nf  savings  mobilized via the formal
financial sector may be more productive than the same quantity of savings
mobilized through informal channels.  Eeeause the supply of credit in curb
markets is limited.  money lenders  itn  these mart ts operate on a small scale
and charge high interest rates.  Cuonequentlv. borrowers use these funds
mostly for short-term projects and for a':tiviti-s  where the potential7
competition  for  funding  is low,  as in  the  nontradable  sector. 5 Given  the
high degree  of  variability  of intzrest  rates  across  informal  markets  and
among  different  types  of lending,  "the  main burden  of ensur"ng  that  there
is uniformity  in  borrowing  rates  and  that  competition  is  brLadly  based
rests  with direct  bank lending"  (Shaw  1973:85).
3.  The  Sri  Lankan  Setting
After  becoming  an independent  member  ot the  British  Commonwealth  in
1948,  Ceylon  (as  it  was then  commonly  called)  maintained  an open  trade
reginte  and  a generally  free  domestic  economy,  but subsequent  government
decisions  had practically  closed  the  economy  to the free  flow  of imports  by
the  mid-1960s.  By then,  the  Bank  of  Ceylon  had  been  nationalized  for
five  years  and  a state-owned  commercial  bank (The  People's  Bank)  had  been
established  to  meet the  financial  needs  of  Ceylon's  rurel  areas. Aided  by
prohibitions  on the  opening  of new  branch  offices  by foreign  banks,  and  the
opening  of  new accounts  in foreign  banks  by Ceylon's  inhabitants,  the  two
state-controlled  banks  had  grown  rapidly. The financial  sector  was
extremely  repressed,  and  there  was little  room  for  independent  and
efficient  financial  intermediation  (Khatkhate,  1982). The  insurance
industry  had  been  nationalized  in 1963,  and  large  and  growing  percentages
of the  industrial,  trade,  and  agricultural  sectors  were owned  by
inefficient  state  enterprises. The  currency  was  highly  overvalued,  and
most  prices  were stringently  controlled.
Despite  the steep  rise  in  government  intervention  in the  economy  during
the 1960s, Ceylon's economic growth was fairly respectable.  The average
annual rate of GDP growth during the decade was 4.5 percent, while average
annual growth in per canita income  was 2.1 percent.
The period from 1970 to 1977 was marked by further government
intervention in the economy and declining growth rates.  In 1972 (the same
year in which Ceylon was formally renamed Sri Lanka), the government
consolidated its control over the mobilization of household savings by
setting up a National Savings Bank.  By the mid-1970s, almost C0 percent of
the total credit extended by al' financial market institutions was directly
absorbed for budgetary purposes (Lee, 1987), and the balance was rationed
in favor of preferred institutions (mostly public corporations).  With the
enlarged conscription of funds from the banking system to finance public
sector activities, the government succumbed to the temptation to set
interest rates at low levels.  Given continuing inflation (which  had begun
in the late 1960s), this produced negative real interest rates (Table 4).
The stock  market stayed in the dolcdrums  during the first half of the
1970s, with total share turnover declininr to 2.5  million Rs. in 1975,
compared with 19.8 million in 195'  fV  arinatilakp  1986).  Constraints on
foreign exchange remittances JiscUadeid f'reign-ownec 4 companies from buving
5.  One  way  of  saving  this  is  that  the  a  tivlties  of  the  informal  sector
are  less  contestable  as  it  isz  ihroft  A  f're  ipn  competition,
6.  For  details  on  Sri  Lanka's  trade  and  i'evelApment  policy since
independence  see  Rajapatirana  f19988  and  th  *1.'rks  cited  theiein.8
or selling  the  shares  they  owned,  while  threats  of  nationalization
prevented  the  incorporation  of new  companies. Meanwhile,  about  one  in
every  five  Sri  Lankan  workers  was unemployed.
Pervasive  restrictions  on the  financial  system  had  produced  a  process
of financial  disintermediation.  The  degree  of financial  intermediation,  as
measured  by the  M2/GNP  ratio,  declined  or re..-.ned  stagnant  in  most  years.
In 1977,  this  ratio  was  well below  the  level  recorded  in the  early  1960s
(Khatkhate,  1982). In short,  the  financial  sector  was  moriburd,  and the
two  major  state-owned  banks  held  82 percent  :in  value)  of all  deposits  in
the  banking  system.
Average  annual  growth  in GDP  between  1970  and 1977  slumped  to 3 percent
(1.2  percent  in  per  capita  term^.).  By 1974,  the  share  of GDP  produced  by
the  public  sector  had  risen  to  x_.2  percent  (from  5.7  percent  in 1961),  and
nationalization  of the  tea,  ruI-ber,  and  coconut  plantations  had raised  this
above  20 percent  by 1977.  The  country's  legendary  ability  to give  its
people  a higher  standard  of living  was rapidly  disappearing.
3.1  Key  Elements  of the  1977  Policv  Reform 7
Consternation  over  economic  stagnation  Eet  the  stage  for  market-
oriented  policy  reform  in 1977: trade  liber.alization,  a significant
exchange  rate  realignnment,  new incentives  for  foreign  investors,  overhaul
of financial  markets,  limits  on public  sector  participation  in the  economy,
and  the  removal  of price  controls  and  government  monopolies  in  domestic
trade. Half-heartedness  and inconsistencies  characterized  the
implementation of the new policies, but their mere existence marked a clear
departure from the conventional wisdom of the closed eccnomy era.
Trade Policy Reform
Trade policy reform  was the key element in 1977.  Sri Lanka's
quantitative restrictions on imports  were supplanted by a revised system of
tariffs, and this far-reaching change was accompanied by the removal of
most of the price controls on domestic trade.  While many of the tariff
changes involved a gazetted increase in the rate, the degree of protection
provided  reviously by way of licensing  was significantly reduced.  Some
280 items  remained under license, but for the most part licenses  were
issued freely.  Subsequent measures in this area were of a corrective kind.
A few items whose free importation  had  "damaging" impact on public
enterprises were returned to the licensing list, and certain tariff rates
were increased from time to time to increase revenues.  The average
effective rate of protection for the manufacturing sector increased
7.  Elements of the 1977 policy reform package and its implementation,
particularly the trade reform and its consequences.  have been examined
in detail elsewhere (Lal and RaJapatirana 1989: Cuthbertson and
Athukorala 1990).
8.  These items together accounted fll-  al-ut 9  percent of import  value in
1980 (a  normal' year followitng  liileiaiizatiinr)  (Cuthbertson and
Athukorala.  1990).9
marginally  (by  3  percent)  between  1978  and  1984,  but  at the  same  time  the
average  degree  of dispersion  of sectoral  protection  declined  by about  6
percent.
The  opening  up of the  economy  was limited  to  current  account
transactions.  While  restrictions  on remitting  investment  income  or the
proceeds  of sales  of assets  by foreign  firms  were removed,  the  prohibition
on overseas  capital  transactions  by Sri  Lankan  citizens  remained  intact.
To supplement  import  liberalization,  the  dual  exchange  rate  system
introduced  in  1968  was abolished,  and  the  new  unified  rate  was placed  under
a  manag-d  float. This  resulted  in  an initial  devaluation  of almost  100
percent. The  cumulative  effect  of trade  and  exchange  rate  reform  was
quickly  reflected  in a significant  improvement  in  the  overall  profitability
of tradable  production  (Table  3).
Financial  Market  Reforms
The  major  emphasis  in financial  market  reform  involved  interest  rate
policy. The  bank rate  was raised  from  8.5  percent  to 10  percent,  and this
was followed  by a sbhrp  increase  !n int  rest  rates  on  deposits  at the
government-owned  National  Saving  Bank (NSB). Commercial  banks  followed
suit (Table  4).  By 1980,  due  to rising  inflation,  real  interest  rates
again  became  negative.
The  govern.nent  responded  by increasing  NSB rates  once  more,  thus
triggering a second round of increases by the commercial banks.  Interest
rates on deposits have been freely determined since then, with the Treasury
bill rate serving as the lower limit and the deposit rates of the National
Development Bank the upper limit. 9 There is no direct interference by
authorities in the determination of lending rates, however.
In the area of institutional reform, the prohibition on new foreign
bank branch offices, which had been in place since 1961 was relaxed in
1979.  By mid-1980, 14 foreign banks had opened branches in Colombo,
bringing the total number of foreign banks operating in the country to 21
(Table 1).  Another institutional  measure authorized all commercial banks
to operate Foreign Currency Banking Units (FCBUs).  An FCBU is permitted to
undertake offshore banking services (accepting  deposits and ,-r?nting  loans
in designated foreign currencies) to nonresidents, commercial banks, free
trade zone enterprises, and other residents approved by the Central Bank.
These developments in banking, and rapid expansion by finance
cor.panies,  set the stage for some competition in deposit mobilization and
interest rates.  An active interbank market also emerged.  However, these
9.  The rates paid by major commercial banks have continued to be lower
than NDB rates.  Some of the newly opened foreign banks and almost all
finance companies (privatelv  owned deposit-taking institutions involved
mainly in hire- purchase and leasing financing),  however, pay rates
higher than these rates.  Major commercial banks are able to pay lower
rates because they provide additional services to customers.10
developments  reduced  the  preeminence  of the  two state-owned  banks  only
marginally (Tables  1 and  2).
The most important  policy  initiative  in  the sphere  of credit  allocation
was the  termination  of the  Comprehensive  Rural  Credit  Scheme,  under  which
the  Central  Bank offered  an interest  rate  subsidy  and a 75 percent
defaultage  guarantee  to  commercial  banks (mostly  to the two state-owned
banks)  on cheap loans  provided  to the agricultural  sector.  It  was expected
chat  ending  tne programn  would encourage  commercial  banks to become  active
in grantirng  agricultural  credit (Sanderatne,  1989).10
These  actions  notwithstanding.  initiatives  on the credit  supply  side
generally  meant an intensification  of government  intervention  rather  than
liberalization. Following  the interest  rate reform,  for  example,  the
Central  lank intensified  its  intervention  in  credit  allocation. The  Medium
and  Long  Term Credit  Fund,  a little-used  1963  scheme  to refinance  loans
maturing  in 3 to 15  years  by commercial  banks  and  development  finance
institutions  (DFIs),  was revised  in 1979  with a view  to directing  resources
into  priority  areas.  Prior  to this,  the  program  had only two categories:
development  of agriculture,  and "other." Under  the revision,  agricultural
development  was divided  into four  subcategories,  and export-oriented
proiects  were accorded  priority. More elaborate  operational  procedures
were set  up,  while final  approval  of each  individual  project  was retained
by the Central  Bank.  Refinancing  allowed  the lending  bank  a final  margin
of  . percent,  a lending  rate  below the  market interest  rate for  similar
loans.
Then,  a National  Development  Bank  was established  by the government  to
provide  project finance,  equity  funding,  and refinancing  to public  and
private  enterprises  in priority  areas.  The Central  Bank plays  a supportive
role  in the  operation  of the  NDB by guaranteeing  repayment  of loans
provided  by  N1DB  under  a Small  and Medium  Industry  loan  scheme (SMI).
In 1985,  the  Central  Bank launched  a  scheme  to establish  Regional  Rural
Development  Banks (RRDBs)  (which  essentially  took  the form  of regional
outlets  providing  cheap  credit).  The goal  was "to  build  a sound  rural
credit  structure  because  the  existing  commercial  banks  i- the country  were
not  granting  an appropriate  amount of credit  to the rural sector"  (Central
Bank, 1985).
A National  Credit  Plan had been  introdu_ed  in 1981 as a way  to monitor
the expansion  of credit  to the private  sector and to direct  credit  to
priority  areas. 11 Under  this plan. the Central Bank allocated  credit
12.  Credit  provided  undJpr  thi;  ;  hem-  a  -'inte,'  for  about  7  percent  of
total bank  credit  to'  the private  seo-tor  hy the mid-1970s.  The default
rate haJ  -limbed close to 80  per-.ent.
11. There  5eems  to have  be-r a sit.nifi  ant  external"  influence  behind
these poliov  initiative?  of th- C-ntiRl  Fan1-. The RRDB  scheme was
modeled  after a similar s':hem-  in Inlia. 'uiner  the advice  of an expert
from  the Reserve  Bank of India  'Malhetra.  198  and 1982  (published  in
1989)).  The external  influence  an also,  be identified  in the designing
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among the  banks  by negotiation. There  were  no penalties  for  noncompliance,
but the  Central  Bank tried  to  bring  banks into line  through  "moral
persuasion."
No attempt  was  made, however,  to reduce  the government's  absorption  of
financial  savings  mobilized  through  the "captive"  financial  institutions.
About 90 percent  of the  NDB's loan  portfolio  continued  to take  the form  of
investment  in  government  securities, 12 and a similar  pattern  wan
observable  in the  operations  of the  government-managed  provident  fund (EPF)
and insurance  corporations.
Accompanying  Policies
A major setback  to the impl-mentation  of policy  reform  occurred  in the
areas  of exchange  rate  management,  export  promotion,  and  public sector
enterprises. After about  1981,  the Central  Bank gradually  intensified  its
intervention  in  the foreign  exchange  market  to support  the  exchange  rate  of
the rupee.  The rupee  then  gradually  appreciated  in real  terms,  with
adverse  implications  for  tradable  production  (Table  3).  The  newly
established  Export  Development  Board  then  had little  success  in restoring
incentive  levels,  since  the financial  incentives  it could  provide  to
exporters  were miniscule  compared  with the  massive  disincentive  of currency
appreciation.
While a few loss-making  public  enterprises  were either  shifted  to the
private  sector  or closed  down,  many others  continued  to  operate  despite
dismal  performance  and ongoing  dependence  on budgetary  transfers. Further,
a  number  of ccrporations  continued  to receive  preferential  treatment,
including  high tariffs  and quota  protection  (Cuthbertson  and  Athukorala,
1990).  During  the period  1977-85,  almost  Z5 percent  of total  annual
budgetary  expenditures  took the form  of transfers  to  public  enterprises.
The comparable  figure  for  the period  1970-76  was only 10 percent.
The chief  constraint  to the realization  of gains from  economic
liberalization,  however,  was the  macroeconomic  instability  generated  by a
massive  public investment  program  that  included  a billion-dollar
multipurpose  irrigation  project  (the  Mahaweli  Development  Program,  or  MDP),
a large  public  housing  program,and  an urban  development  program.
Between  1978  and 1982,  these  three  projects  absorbed  about 75  percent
of public investment,  the  Mahaweli  project  alone accounting  for  45 percent.
The imports  needed for  the projects  were largely  financed  by aid  donors,
but  the pressure  on the Sovernment  budget  to provide counterpart  funds was
substantial. Thus,  the projects  put  pressure  on the  government's  ability
(continued  from  previous  page)
of the  Export  Credit  Insurance  Corporation  and various  export-credit
schemes  of the  Central  Bank.
12. Investment  in government  securities  carried an interest  rate of about
10  percent  as compared  with the  NSE,  deposit  rates  of 11 to 18  percent.
The loss  to the NSB  resulted  from this difference was  covered bv a
subsidy from  the treasury.12
to  mainitain  macioeconomic  sta1ility.  Thes  direct  expenditure  effects  of the
Vr  CO  .c  ou`T1d  w;ith  inflationarv  pressure  that  originated  in  deficit
tinan  ing,  c'nt  L ibuted  to  an  apprec  ia  ion  of  the  real  exchange  rate  with
ad3verse  implications  for  the  tradable  goods  sector.  Macroeconomic
instalility  thenl  compelled  the government  to take  some policy  steps which
Lan  ounter  to the l17-  reforms.  For instance,  import  duties were
incr-easedl  trorn  time to time  for revenue purposes.  with  adverse protective
effects.  Cr.edit  ceilings,  and higher  reserve requirement  ratios on
comm,1ercial  btank  deposits,  produced  a credit  crurnch  which  negated  the
anti  ipat  ed tavoiab)le  supply side effects of financial  reform.  Finally,
intlattionar:v  prs  sures  gen9rated  bV  the  public  investment  program  shriveled
etoded  real  initerest  rates, with adverse  implications  for savings
molilization.
Empirical  Analysis
To  set  the  stage  in  applying  the  above  framework,  it is necessary  to
assess  the  impact  of  reform  on  financial  deepening.  Then, an attempt  is
made  to trace the connection  between the new  financial  regime and the
outcome of trade liberalization.  This  is followed by an examination  of the
impa t  of financial  policies  on the availability  and distribution  of
loanabie  funds,  with  emphasis  on  the  implications  for  private-sector
investmernt.  In  particular.  changes  in  the  interest  rate  structure  and
sectoral  allocation  of credit  are examined with  a view  to identifying  the
irpli:at  ions  of the financial  regime on expected  efficiency  gains from
trade liberalization.  Finallv,  the findings of the previous  sections are
re:-onsideied  in light of the nec-structuralist  emphasis  on the crowding  out
ette  o  of finan,  ial retor-m  on  the cuLb market.
.l  Financial  Deepening  and Savings Molilization
Fasic in_iivators  of the  financial  depthi  of the economy  are presented  in
Ta!ble  K  It is evidenit.  that  interest  rate reform  in 1977 was  followed  by a
remarkabile  improvement  in financial  intermediation.  The M3/GDP  ratio rose
from an average  level of 2, percent  in the 1970-77 period  to 34  percent  in
- al.!  stalilize.  at  arounld  4O  percent  in the 1980-87 period.  While Ml
-n,  irn1e  o  increase  in  Lrel terms.  its ratio to GDP  declined.  This
'R  A  r  S  t-S  a shift in household  aszet portfolios  from cash holdings
to  savinv  and time deposits  (STPsl  in response  to favorable  interest  tates.
-o  examine  the role of interest  rate changes  in determining  the pattern of
tirnan  al inteLmediationl,  we estimated  demand  functions  for Ml and STD.
The  explanatoiv  variables  use.1  in each eauation -. ere real CDF  'toe  represent
'-  vR-alth  tfe.t'.  thp ;icht;.-av;race  4av:ncR and time  depj,,ie  rate
RFSTP  ,  represent  owin  ra-  i' - iznn  'TD1  sr  the  opportunitv  cost  of
'1.8!'sr.=  !!ing  . ...  F1*  .. 1 L?F; >  a  tr4  ?  'n "'  v' '  'n-p'~r  L i  .-J  lag.  FE  -mlinus  thie
:ea'  rate  . retun  .n  Iash  ala-  -;  a  t'ons  were  estimated  usinc
*!1 st  za:  -9  vsr-'s  n-l.'  .!.  vib  *.l:  'amiab>les  expressed  in
-*'.w: artK-'.-;  "  -a  - i  '  .l_m'  .-. ai  ` 3 I  an  intercept  dummv  and
-:r-.'  :r  eX-'.t  ia'-  '  re included  to tect  ths
-t  pre- and post-r  t-rm
.:  i.Tl  r  .'.R1i'.'--  m-al-  !:  1'b*!  tinal  regressiot'.  nrl
. m  ..  !  .M-inl  th  '  a*F_  '-?.a  a  - t  F-test'  for  variable
!-:-  p-.  T-';  :  !- ;  's  ar  r  Ip.'t@  K  TR`W7-  7h-  two regreLDssions  pas  s
'vea  1  F  :all  initi  an  e  a.:  i!  F.a-m<ev - F.ESET test  for13
appropriateness  of functional  form.  (The  basic  assumptions  relating  to the
OLS error  process  were amply  supported  by various  test statistics.)
The result  for the  RSTD  variable  in both  equations  suggests  that
individual  financial  asset-holding  behavior  strongly  depends  on the rate  of
return  on bank deposits.  For  the post-  reform  period (1978-87),  a one
percent  increase  in  RSTD seems  to  have been associated  with a 0.8 percent
decline  in real  cash holdings  and a 4.2 percent  increase  in real  RSTD.  The
equation  for STD showed  a significant  wealth  effect  operating  upon
financial  savings  behavior:  a one-percent  change in  GDP  was associated  with
a 1.5  percent  change  in STD.  This  effect  on demand for  Ml was also
statistically  significant.  but  much smaller (0.5  percent).  In sum,
portfolio  shifts (both  from  cash balances  and other  assets)  triggered  by
interest  rate  policy  were behind  the surge  in  bank deposits  (and  hence  the
degree  of financial  intermediation),  while the  weaith  effect  generated  by
liberalization-led  income  growth  seems  to have  played  an important  but
secondary  role.
Was the  growth  of financial  savings  reflected  in  an increase  in the
level  of total  domestic  savings? According  to the  McKinnon-Shaw  thesis,  a
positive  link  between interest  rates  and financial  savings  also implies  a
positive  link  between  the former  and total  domestic  savings  (investment),
for  at least  two reasons. First,  according  to  McKinnon's "complementarity
hypothesis"  in a developing  country  context,  a decision  to accumulate
financial  savings  is  coterminous  with a decision  to acquire  physical
capital. Second,  given limited  portfolio  choices,  the  savings  process  in
these  countries  tends  to  be highly "money  intensive"  (McKinnon,  1976). A
contrary  view is  expressed  by the  neo-structuralists,  who argue  that  while
raising  the rate  of return  on bank  deposits  is likely  to induce  a portfolio
shift  in favor  of that  asset,  such  a response  need not reflect  more savings
but simply  a decline  in other  assets  (Taylor,  1988).
Jayawardena  et al. (1987)  interpret  the  Sri Lankan  experience  as
supportive  of the  neo-structuralist  position. Despite  the impressive
growth  of bank  deposits,  there  was "little  evidence  of any-significant
mobilization  of domestic  savings"  (p.  27).  But the data  reported  in  Table
8 suggest  that this  observation,  based  on an  analysis  of data  on total
domestic  savings,  is  misleading. During  this  period,  public  sector  savings
performance  did  not show  any improvement,  indicating  the country's  heavy
dependence  on foreign  aid.  t)onetheless,  the  behavior  of private  savings
was an impressive  improvement  over the  pre-reform  period.  For-  instance.
the  average  propensity  to save (the  private  savings  to private  ineome
ratio, or PRS/YPR)  increased  from  14.4 ptr-ent  in  the  197Q-76 p-jri'd  t(
20.2 percent  in the 1977-84 period.  Ec('nmetri.w  -rk  (Athukorala  and
Jayasuriya,  1989) lends  supj'('tt  t'  the  - j-  ti4'f  intPrest  rat'j  r;t''rm  wa-y
laid behind  this  improvement.  The-  -timato-  -ugaest an  inteleZt.  late
elasticitv  ''f  .98  per_ent  and  an  in  omf  Wla  i  ity  ('t  1.22  per  ent.  t'L
private  savings.  In  sum.  whpn  the  analv-in  i- appropriately  f'uqewl  on
private  savings  behaviol.  thi-  SL i  LasnkIan  -xl  i. i "nf  e  pr''vides  ampl  Qupl-
for  the  McKinnon-Shaw  vipw  point  ]
13.  The  evidence  on  interest  elast  i  i,v  f  'an  in  1XveP1o!inV  'nt  I i@,
which  come  from  numerous  multi-  'untrv  - studies,  i-  tar
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4.2 Financial  Liberalization  and the  Real  Exchange  Rate
In section  2,  we presented  the theoretical  case for  expecting
complementarity,  operating  via the real  exchange  rate,  between  financial
liberalization  and the  outcome  of trade  liberalization. In particular,  it
was postulated  that  financial  deepening  would  help sustain  depreciation  in
the real  exchange  rate  by containing  aggregate  demand  pressure  and by
tilting  household  asset  demand  away from  nontradable  assets  and towards
interest-bearing  bank  deposits.
The empirical  evidence  presented  in the  previou3  section  showed  that
both financial  savings  and total  private  savings  responded  favorably  to
interest  rate reform. This evidence,  in turn,  supports  the  view that
interest  rate reform  was instrumental  in  dampening  the impact  on nontraded
goods  prices  of the  surge in  private  income (expenditure)  triggered  by
trade  reform.  In the  absence  of high interest  rates,  the  expansion  of
domestic  demand  would  have been stronger,  and thus  would have created
greater  pressure  to push the real  exchange  rate  upward.
Any attempt  to  make a detailed  analysis  of the impact  of interest  rate
policy  on household  asset-holding  behavior  was hampered  by an absence  of
time  series  data.  Nevertheless,  data from  the  Consumer  Finances  Survey  of
the  Central  Bank  provide  some support  for  our hypothesis  (Table  9).  Bank
deposits  as a share  of household  asset  portfolios  reached  33 percent  in
1981-82,  as compared  with a historical  figure  of less  than 10  percent. 14
(continued  from  previous  page)
from clear.  (see Fry, 1989, Gonzales-Arrieta,  1988  for surveys of this
literature).  While  some studies come  down against any  interest  rate
effect  on savings,  the others  find a positive  but rather  small interest
elasticity  (around 0.1 percentage  point)  which  is "not large enough  to
warrant  great policy  significance"  (Fry, 1989, p.20).  The
appropriateness  of the multi-country  cross-section  approach  (which
implicitly  assume  that the observations  are drawn from a  "homogenous
universe")  to measure  the average  saving propensity  for a diverse  group
of countries  is, however.  highly  queltionable.  The  few available
country  studiec  (eg. anis and Riedel  1QPQ. Y-usuf  and Kyle-Feters,  1984
have,  in fact, produced  int-r-t- ola  iit  Pstimates  which  ars qimilai
in magnitude  to our  estimate  for Sri Lanka.
14. The,  mild  decline  in this -hare  in  l 37-7  as reflected  in the survey
data  iq  come-w'hat  puz7linc.  Thp '7ontL1l  Pank ascribes  this decline  to
"oneun)lts'  ruTh  to  iati-v  thloii  1-n-up  domarnd  (  accumulated  Ovftr  a
lonw  period  of  import  iestrictionq,  fi  JouLalle  consumer  goods.
following  the trade liberalizati.n  (C.-nttal  Bank. Consumet  Finances
Survey  19?e,'79.  Part  1,  p.  171.15
To ascertain  the  cumulative  impact  of financial  deepening  on the real
exchange  rate,  we developed  the following  model and then  used  annual  data
for the  period  1970-87:
RER =  f(FIR,  NFC,  GEXP, BMP,  TOT)
fl>l;  f2,f 3,f4,f5 <0
Where,
RER =  the real  exchange  rate,  defined  as the  relative  price  of
traded  goods to  nontraded  goods,
FIR  =  the  financial/intermediation  ratio (M3/GDP),
NFC =  net foreign  capital  as a ratio  of GDP,
GEXP =  government  expenditures  measured  as a proportion  of GDP,
BMP  =  the  black  market premium  on the  official  exchange  rate
measured  as (BER-ER)/ER  where BER  and ER represent  the black
market and the  official  exchange  rates,  defined  as rupees  per
US dollar,  and
TOT  =  terms of trade  (1980 =  1.0).
Because  of the difficulties  involved  in  directly  measuring  the prices
of traded  and  nontraded  goods,  the  real  exchange  rate  is usually  proxied  by
the  nominal  exchange  rate,  adjusted  for  change in  the  weighted  average  of
the  wholesale  price indexes  of trading  partners  relative  to the  domestic
consumer  price index  (e.g.,  Edwards.  1988:  Favaro  and Spiller.  1989:
Cottani  and Garcia,  1989).  This  proxy  measure is  based  on the (rather
restrictive]  "law  of one price"  assumption  (Warr,  1986).  In this  study  we
measured  the RER  using implicit  deflators  derived  directly  from  the
national  income  accounts  for tradable  and  nontradable  production.
The degree  of financial  intermediation  (the  key regressor  in the  model)
was represented  by the  M3/GDP ratio.  The black  market premium  was included
to capture  the impact  of government  intervention  on the real  exchange  rate.
The expected  effect  of an overvalued  exchange  rate,  of course,  is  that it
tends  to suppress  the  prices  of tradables. Thus,  we would expect  a
negative  sign  for the coefficient  of this  variable. The use of the other
three variables  is now standard  procedure  in determining  the real exchange
rate.
The model was estimated  using  the ordinary  least squares method.  As  in
the case of estimating  money  demand  functions  (Table 7), a dummy variable
technique  was employed  to detect  anv structural break  ir the hvpothesized
relationships  that might  have  followed  the 1977 reforms.  Onlv  the  slope
dummy  for  FIR  was  found  to  be  imilortant.  Thor; was  high collinearity
between  TOT, and NFC and CE.XF.  and ex(  luqir  'i the former impr':ed  the
statistical  significance  of the-  *'ettii  iTltz +'t  'h'.  latter tW'  'VaLial'l-'.
The results are reported  iTn  TaIl'l  1..
The coptfitient  ot FIR wac nlt  icti'allv  signiticant  for thi. peri(-
1970-77.  Eut it  was  highl;  -icniti-  ant !jith  thW expe'ted  sign  ttr tlh
poqstreform  period  (1978-?  . -ip'r  tillLc  '11  hV:  Phecic  that  V.eal,  'L
finiancial  intermediation  (a  hIiev.!!  nh''Ic  t jant  ial retorm  Tit Lil'ut  d t
improvement  in  the  competitiveneqq  ,t  tira  alVl  'rod'iUt  ion.  We  us.sper  t  thtla
the  failure  of  our  model  to  Jete(t  a  icoitic  ant  relationshij  between  REF16
and FIR during the pre-reform period was due to purely statistical reasons.
First, our RER series might not have been a satisfactory indicator of real
exchange rate behavior in an economy characterized by quantitative
restrictions (QRs).  In the presence of QRs, the distinction between traded
and nontraded goods becomes blurred; commodities subject to QRs are usually
priced not on the basis of the prices of competitive imports but on the
basis of domestic demand and supply (as in the case of nontradables)
(Corden, 1987).  Second, the degree of year-to-year variability of both
data series was rather small.  Given this "insufficient"  variability, our
regLession exercise may have failed to distinguish the effect of the FIR on
the RER from other random effects on the latter.  As we expected, both net
foreign capital inflow (NFC)  and government expenditures (GEXP) seem to
have exerted significant downward pressure on the real exchange rate.  By
contrast, the coefficient of BMP was not statistically different from zero.
This result supports the view that the real exchange rate is determined by
real variables, and that therefore the nominal exchange rate has little
influence upon it (Brock  and Tower, 1986).
To sum up, our regression exercise provided a useful framework for
understanding the behavior of the real exchange rate in Sri Lanka following
the 1977 reforms.  While interest rate reform had a notably salutary effect
on the real exchange rate, this effect was crowded out by the much stronger
combined negative effect of massive capital inflows and uncontrolled public
expenditures.  Consequently, the significant improvement in the country's
international competitiveness achieved through trade liberalization  was
short-lived (Table  3).  Had it  not been for the favorable impact of
increased financial deepening, the squeeze on the profitability of tradable
producticni  during the ensuing period would have been much sharper.
4.3 Volume of Credit and Private Investment
The increase in financial intermediation after reform (section 4.1) was
reflected in a massive increase in the volume of institutional lending.
Total real credit recorded a three-fold increase from Rs. 15,361 million in
1977 to  Rs. 47,798 million in 1985 (Table  11).  There was also a major
shift in the allocation of credit in favor of the private sector.  That
sector's share increased from 28 percent in 1977 to 60 percent in 1985, at
the expense of the combined share of the government and public sector
corporations.  As noted above (section  3.2), financial reform did not
include any measure to allow greater freedom for the portfolio decisions of
government-owned nonbank financial institutions.  Instead, these
institutions continued to function as  captive sources' of budgetarv
finance.  The increase in private sector credit therefore came
predominantly from commercial banks.  Refle:tinz the government's emphasis
on guided credit to prioritv sectr-<.  i-'Jit  -xtended by the development
finance  institutions  (PFIss  di.l  in(r-asz  (TaIle  13), but their  share of
total  i7stitutional  .-redit  allocated  t-  the private  sector  increased  to
only  7  per.ent  by  1985.  In  that  vear.  ommercial  banks  accounted  for  8517
percent of such credit, with the balance coming mostly from finance
companies.15
Expansion of institutional credit was undoubtedly a factor in the
expansion of private sector investment in the postreform economy.  Private
fixed investment as a share of GDP increased from an average level of 8.5
percent in the early 1970s to 18 percent in 1978-82 (Table 15).  Between
these two periods, the share of fixed investment in private-sector income
rose from 10 percent to 18 percent.
To delineate the link between institutional credit and private fixed
investment (PRW), an investment function  was estimated using annual data
for the period 1960-82.16  The explanatory variables were total real
(1980) institutional credit to the private sector (ICP), the real GDP
growth rate estimated in terms of logarithmic differences (YR), real public
sector fixed investment (PBIV), an index of rental cost of capital (RC), 17
and PRIV with a one-year lag (PRIV(-1)).  The inclusion of YR as an
explanatory variable implied an accelerator-type relationship between the
level of domestic economic activity and capital formation.  PBIV was chosen
as an explanatory variable in light of the debate on the crowding out
effect (Blejer and Khan, 1984).  PRIV(-l) was included as a regressor on
grounds that the adjustment of actual investment to the desired level is
not completed within a single period.
The estimated investment function is,
ln PRIV  =  - 0.33  +  0.63  ln ICP  - 0.34  ln PBIV(-l)
(0.25) (3.52)*  (2.26)**
+  0.05  ln  (1+YR)  - 0.07  ln RC  +  0.71  ln PRIV  (-1)
(3.14)*  (1.17)  (4.73)*
R2 =  0.92  F = 49.3  LM = 0.02
RESET2  = 0.03  JB =  0.96  WH =  0.85
15. Estimated using figures obtained from,  Central Bank, Review of the
Economy.  Figures used in the remainder of this paper, unless otherwise
stated, come from this source.
16. The Central Bank has stopped publishing a qeparate private investment
series since 1983.
17.  This  index  is  constructed  as  RC = [PIH  (1 *  NLR)/PJ  100
where PIM =  [price of investment goods proxied by the import price
index of investment goods (1080  = 10'" (adjusted for the dual exchange
rate (FEEC) premium for the perio"d  l9I53-,  ILR =  nominal one-vear
(maximum) lending rate of commer.  ial I(ank's  and F =  implicit  GDP
deflator (1980=100) for non-service a tivities.18
Notes
(1)  t-ratios are given in parentheses, with level of significance
denoted  as * = 1Z and  ** = 52.
(2)  For definitions of test statistics, see note 1 to Table 7.
According to the regression results, the short-run (one-year)
elasticity of real private investment  with respect to loanable funds was
0.63.  This figure, when combined with the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable, yields a long-run elasticity estimate of 2.17.  Thus,
the hypothesis that private investment depends crucially on the
availability of credit is supported overwhelmingly.  The results also
support the hypotheses on the positive impact of income growth and the
negative impact (the crowding out effect) of public sector investment on
private investment.  But these influences seem much less important in
magnitude as compared with the impact of credit availability.  The
coefficient of RC is not statistically different from zero.  From the use
of the available data, there is no statistical support for the statement
that "higher interest rates and the high cost of investment appear to have
inhibited private investment activity" (Jayawardena  et al., 1987:29; see
also Roe, 1982).  Ideally, one would have compared the rate of interest and
the marginal efficiency of capital to test whether high interest rates
inhibited investment.  But in the absence of estimates for the marginal
efficiency of capital it was necessary to estimate the specific investment
function.
Commenting on the Sri Lankan finance  market liberalization from a neo-
structuralist perspective, Roe (1982:248) noted that deposit interest rates
were much higher "than the underlying productivity of the economy's capital
will allow."  But the regression results reported above do not accord with
that view, which can also be disputed on other grounds.  First, the
empirical basis for Roe's view came fLom estimates of return on capital
(which  vary from 5 to 10 percent) for  public sector corporations.  Our
estimates of profitability for a sample of p.lic  limited liability
companies in the private sector, however, present an entirely different
picture (Table 16).  Second, it is inappropriate in any case to  make a
judgment about the desirable interest rate on the basis of a profitability
estimate coming from the previous controlled trade regime, since the for-es
set in motion by liberalization  would be expected to improve the
profitability of investment.  According to both macro-level and firm-level
data (Tables 3 and 16), the profitability of private sector production
improved remarkably following the trade reforms.  As has been discussed in
detail elsewhere (Cuthbertson and Athukorala. 1990). it  was inconsistencies
in the overall policy package which caused  the improvement in profitability
(particularly that of traded Roods) t.' deterioiate afterwards.  Third. as
the experience of the ensuing years clearlv indicates. the increase in the
cost of credit cannot be ascribed entirely to higher eeposit rates.  The
interest rate spread tended to widen in the early 1980s (Table 4),
reflecting the impact of other factors. including the increased19
restrictiveness in monetary policy,18 high inflation, a new business
turnover tax on interbank transactions, and the mounting operational costs
of government-owned baniks  (see  Lindrer.  et al., 1986, and Datta, 1983, for
details).  Finally, as noted above, even though total credit to the private
sector increased considerably, the government continued to utilize well
over a third of total institutional savings through its authority over
nonbank financial institutions.  The interest rate outcome would have been
different if  measures had been taken to redress this compartmentalization
in the financial markets.
4.4 Efficiency of Credit Allocation
The analysis in the previous section provides empirical support for the
view that financial reform, by augmenting the volume of institutional
credit, played an important role in facilitating supply-side adjustment in
the economy.  This section extends that analysis by focusing on the pattern
of credit allocation.  In light of the theoretical discussion in section 2,
we focus on two aspects of the credit allocation process, namely,
borrowers' access to institutional credit and the degree of dispersion in
the cost of credit for  various types of borrowing.
There are no time series data on the distribution of institutional
credit at the firm level.  The available survey-based evidence, however,
points to an increase in the number of recipients of credit from the
banking system.  For instance, in a comparison of the financial structure
of small-scale enterprises in 1977 and 1986, Islam and Romijn (1988) found
that the percentage of firms  which had obtained financial support during
the period fror the banking system increased from 13 percent to 24 percent.
The findings of  the Consumer Finances Survey of the Central Bank relating
to the distribution of household borrowing by source are consistent with
this pattern (Table 17).  According to this source, the institutional share
in total household borrowing increased from 20.2 percent in 1973 to 25.3
percent in 1978-79 and 40.1 percent in 1981-2.  This overall increase
occurred despite the shrinking of subsidized institutional lending to the
agricultural sector following the termination of the comprehensive credit
scheme.19 At the disaggregated level, the sharpest increase occurred in
borrowing for industrial activities.  There does not seem to have been a
rapid increase, as is popularly alleged, in borrowing for consumption.  As
theory predicts, various elements of financial reform, such as the greater
availability of loanable funds, removal of credit rationing, and a more
flexible interest rate structure  might have contributed to the increased
availability of institutional credit.  Whatever the underlying reason  may
18. The level of statutory reserve requirement on commercial bank deposit
was increased in mid-1981 and again in November 1983, in response to
aggravating macroeconomic imbalance in the economy..  As a result, the
weighted average of reserve requiremenit  on all deposits increased from
7.4:  to 8.1F in 1981 and 10.5' in 1094.
19. Following this step the  share  (if  avri:ultuLal  credit  in  total  hank
credit  to  private  sector declined from  15.  percent  in  1977  to  8.2  in
1982.20
be, the broadening of the credit base may have been instrumental in
improving employment prospects and income distribution.
Did financial reform, by reducing the degree of dispersion in the cost
of credit, contribute to greater neutrality in the incentive structure of
the economy?  An in-depth analysis of this question is not possible, given
the nature of the data base.  There are no time-series data on lending
rates or cost of credit on a sectoral basis.  The only available data are
those relating to the lowest and the highest lending rates of commercial
banks and DFIs (Table 18).  These data show that disparities in borrowing
Lates increased substantially (or else, the credit allocation in the
economy became less efficient) after 1977.  But it could also be that
interest rate deregulation made it easier for less desirable borrowers to
get institutional credit.
The lower rate for commercial bank lending, as well as all rates of the
DEF and NDB, were usually those applicable to loans to sectors accorded
priority under the "directed"  credit policy.  Given an annual inflation
rate of 5 to 12 percent during this period, these rates implied a negative
real cost of capital to preferred borrowers.  By contrast, the upper
(market-determined) rates remained highly positive.  The structure of
lending rates therefore introduced credit market distortions and ran
counter to the primary objective of trade liberalization--realizing gains
from better allocation of resou:ces.
A major explanation for the  wide gap between lending at favored or
nonfavored rates seems to lie in the nature of the banking system itself.
ihe opening of the banking system to foreign competition had only a
marginal impact on the dominance of the two state-owned banks, in terms of
both volume of transactions and extent of lending activities (Tables 1 and
2).  The "old" foreign banks and the locally-owned private banks showed
little interest in extending their operations beyond their traditional
domain of trade financing,  while the "new" foreign banks, were not eager to
do business with purely domestic clients.  The provision of long and
medium-term finance ffr industry and agriculture continued to be the role
of the state-owned banks.  Given the compartmentalized nature of lending,
there  was little competition in loan rates.  Added to this, the state-owned
banks continued to be under pressure to set lending priorities and interest
lending rates  with the government's policy priorities.  Since these banks
were also expected to be profit-making institutions, relatively low (and  at
times negative) interest rates for priority clients usually implied
excessively high rates for on non-priority borrowers.
Administered prioritv lending was based on the premise that "high"
market-determined rates  might deter long-term investment in the tradable
sector and thus jeopardize the sustainabilitv of  trade liberalization. 20
In  lLactice,  however. apart from introducing a significant element of
distortion into the economv. this guided credit policy achieved little.  By
1983. Lefinanced credit  accounted for less than 5  percent of the total
domn-stic  loans  ()f  tommercial  banks.  and  ab')ut  two-thirds  of  this  lending
. This has been a recirrent theme in  the  annual  financial-sector review
in  the  Review i'f  the Econona  of  the Central Bank.21
represented  pre-export  credit  extended  at  a  rate  below  the  Treasury  bill
rate.
Despite  policy  rhetoric,  the  share  of  commercial  bank  credit  allotted
to  the  tradable  sector  relative  to  credit  for  the  nontradable  sector
declined  from  about  1978  (Table  12).  Accompanying  this  was  a  gradual
decline  in  the  combined  share  of  medium  and  long-term  credit  in  total  bank
lending.
The  operation  of  DFIs  was  lackluster.  An  inspection  of  their  lending
records  shows  that  they  were  not  successful  in  allocating  resources  to
priority  sectors,  particularly  export-oriented  industries.  Their  lending
continued  to  be  limited  mainly  to  meeting  the  credit  needs  of  a  handful  of
established  business  groups  with  diversified  interests. 2 1 This  suggests
that  a  large  part  of  the  credit  subsidy  was  diverted  into  nonpriority
sectors.
The  failure  of  Sri  Lanka's  directed  credit  policy  in  the  context  of
trade  liberalization  is  a  subject  which  needs  further  study. 22 However,
the  evidence  considered  so  far  supports  tbe view  that  a  directed  credit
policy  is  unlikely  to  be  successful  when  the  overall  climate  of  incentives
is  moving  in  a  different  direction.
4.5  Financial  Liberalization  and  the  Informal  Credit  Market:  Some
Observations
So  far,  we  have  examined  the  implications  of  financial  reform  with
respect  to  the  formal  money  market  (OMlM).  In  this  section  we  briefly
consider  whether  our  basic  conclusions  neea  to  be  qualified  in  light  of  the
neo-structuralist  crowding-out  argument  against  financial  liberalization
(Section  2.3).  A  formal  test  of  the  crowding-out  hypothesis  is  precluded
by  the  absence  of  required  time-series  data.  However,  there  is  a
21.  In  a  comparison  of  lists  of  client  companies  of  NDB and  DFC  for  1984  we
were  able  to  detect  30  instances  of  the  same  client  appearing  in  both
lists.  Most  of  these  are  well  established  import-substituting
manufacturing  firms  with  a  long  history  of  operation.  Moreover,  the
DFC's  sublist  of  large-scale  clients  for 1984  is  not  much  different
from  a  similar  list  for  the  mid-1970s.  On  the  basis  of  a  li';t  of
exporters  (for  1984)  prepared  hy  the  Exprrt  Development  BoaFld,  we  werP
able  to  identify  only  about  1r)-15  per-'ent  cof  the  client  companies  of
DFC  and  NDB as  exporters.
22.  This  issue  is  of  particular  interest  eiven the  recent  concern  about  ths
need,  in  the  context  of  the  typical  Jeve  loping  economy  where  there  is
nlo  well  developed  equitv  market.  fo-  at  hi-'.ing  a  prr:nec  halan-e  1-twepn
the  confli-ting  o1bje(  ti;'-s  of  maintAinilnw  makL-ket  el.aring  intertL-t
rates  that  would  ensure  effi  i-t-t  a1.1a  IT  IIn  If  rPsui  es  and  p,i,-i  Tinc
a  "growth-promoting"  credit  1  v  -h-.  K'  I  K(ohaia.  1984:  NIEKinnon.
1988;  Collier  and  Mayer,  1989).22
substantial  body  of survey-based  evidence  on informal  credit  markets  in  Sri
Lanka 23 which  permits  us to draw  some  inferences.
In  Sri  Lanka,  as in  many other  developing  countries  (Ghate,  1988).  the
informal  money  market  has continued  to  play  a more important  role  than  th,
formal  market  in  the  provision  of credit. 24 In 1981-82,  for  instance,
almost  60 percent  of the  household  borrowing  in  Sri  Lanka rwhich  includes
borrowing  by informal  businesses  and  cottage  inoustries)  was provided  by
the UMM (Table 17).  According to a mid-1970s survey of the informal sector
in Colombo, over 75 percent of the credit granted to informal businesses
came from informal sources (Marga Institute, 1978 and 1981).  Informal
sources of credit are by no means confined to households and small
businesses. The  Pettah  Money  Market  (the  informal  money  market  in  Colombo)
is believed to  handle vcry large volumes of fun.s (Sanderatne, 1989; Datta,
1983).  However, the mere existence of a sizable UMM does not necessarily
imply significant crowding-out following reforms in the OMM.  This will
occur only if the UMM is "competitive  and agile" (Taylor, 1983), and if it
is closely linked with the OMM so that bank deposits are a better
substitute for UMM claims than cash or other assets.  As argued in Section
2.3, such a characterization may be incorrect in the typical developing
country.  In fact, the competition and agility is restricted to limited
areas and groups.  The evidence from Sri Lanka further illustrates this
point.
One of the important facts shown by this evidence is that "informal
lending consists of a wide range of sources and arrangements, in contrast
to the general tendency to think of informal credit as synonymous with pure
money lending" (Sanderatne, 1989:22).  The share of pure morney  lenders in
the total informal borrowing of households seems to be only about 24
percent (Table 17).  A larger share (31 percer') comes from friends and
relatives in the form of reciprocal transactions.  The rest (55  percent) is
mostly a part of land tenure relations and the systems of produce marketing
and consumer credit.  Under these credit arrangements, the lender usually
has a vested interest in the borrower's economic activity which extends
beyond interest income.
The view that the informal financial  market is segmented,
noncompetitive, and not well integrated  with the formal market, is further
supported by data on the interest rate structure of informal credit (Table
19).  According to the data, nearly 50 percent of such credit is granted
either free of interest or at interest rates which are much lower than
those of institutional credit.  Given the absence of directly observable
interest rates in kinship and patron-client relationships, it is difficult
to compare the terms of credit in the inthrmal market with those of
institutional  credit.  Howevet  . the  l-ull 'v-i  ?5  percent)  of  the  credit
supplied  by  moneylenders  is  -xtendIed  at  -i  v  Iiight  interest  rates.  It
therefore  se~Pms utl  ikPl: that  even  a  dAraQt  iK  iLange  in  institutional
23.  Fernando  (1988S and  S3ntldeLatn.o  (198P  and  IO9R) provide  useful  svntheses
of  this  literature.
. The  relative  importance  ot  U1UI  haC  'f  ]'m!  derlined  as  institutional
l-nding  increased  (Table  17!.23
interest  rates  has  an impact  on the  volume  of informal  credit. This is
perhaps  because  the  financial  technologies  to scrve  different  clients  also
vary  very  much.
In the  informal  financial  system,  moneylenders  rarely  act  as
intermediaries  between  savers  and  investors  (Sanderatne,  1989;  Bouman,
1984). Moneylending  has  been  characterized  as unsocial  and  exploitative  in
Sri  Lanka. Hence,  the  activity  of moneylenders  is often  clandestine  and
restricted  to  known  persons. Moneylenders  usually  operate  with their  own
funds,  and the  average  saver  rarely  considers  them  an alternative  source  of
saving.
Data relating  to the  purpose-wise  distribution  of informal  lending  also
indicate  that it is  predominantly  obtained  for  so-called  nonproductive
purposes,  such  as family  ceremonies  and  emergencies.  Formal  sector
financial  institutions  seldom  are  willing  to  make loans  for  these  purposes.
on the  other  hand,  the  bulk  of the  credit  used for  agricultural,
industrial,  and  other  productive  activities  does  come  from  formal  sources.
For  instance,  according  to  a Central  Bank survey  of planned  investment  in
the  corporate  sector,  'other  sources"  (which  includes  informal  borrowing)
contributed  less  than  5 percent  of the  total  financial  needs  of the
corporate  sector  in 1983/85  (Central  Bank,  1986). The  Marga  Institute
survey  cited  above  found  that  moneylenders  provided  only 1.3  percent  of the
total  borrowings  of informal  sector  businesses  in  Colombo.
In summary,  Sri  Lanka  offers  no evidence  that  funds  flow  freely  and
swiftly  between  formal  and  informal  markets  in response  to interest  rate
differentials.  It is therefore  unlikely  that  the  substitution  from  UMM
would have been of significant magnitude to counterbalance the significant
increase in institutional savings/lending that resulted from the
substitution of bank deposits for currency holdings and real assets
supplemented  with the  wealth effect on demand for financial assets
following the 1977 reforms.24
5.  Summary and Conclusions
The analytical framework
An analytical framework to assess the role of the domestic financial
market in the outcome of trade liberalization outcome was developed and
then applied to Sri Lanka's 1977 trade reform.  At that time the domestic
financial  market was also reformed, reducing financial repression.  The
main finding of the study is that the domestic financial  market plays a
very significant role in the success of a trade liberalization.
In Sri Lanka's case, financial sector reform  helped to some extent to
sustain the greater competitiveness of the tradable sector achieved through
the trade liberalization.  Financial reform,  however, did not go far
enough, and its implementation remained somewhat ambiguous.  The emergence
of large fiscal imbalances after 1982 ther.  weakened the impetus for trade
liberalization.
On the demand side, the domestic financial  market made its impact on
trade liberalization by way of the real exchange rate.  A domestic
financial  market that offers financial assets with attractive rates of
retuLn affords an alternative to the spending of increased income from
trade liberalization on nontradables.  Premature appreciation of the
exchange rate is thus averted.  But high rates of return on financial
assets can only be found in a nonrepressed domestic financial  market.
Moreover, market determined interest rates will influence overall
savings/investment decisions and restrain aggregate demand.  This too will
prevent premature appreciation of the .xchange rate by channeling increased
real savings into investment and thus avoid the need to provide investment
funds through money creation.
On the supply side, a nonrepressed domestic financial  market can
complement trade liberalization by facilitating increased investment in the
tradable sector.  Such a market will also lead to better channeling of
credit for the increased production of tradables induced by a trade
libeLalization.
The Sri Lanka Case
There were several reasons  why the application of our theoretical
fr-amewioLk  to  Sri Lanka made good sense.  First, the 1977 trade
lilberalization  replaced nearlv all the quantitative restrictions on imports
with  tariff-  which  reduced  thl It-:-'l  -f -nli  t!b variance  in prctrt  tion.  and
waq a-compani-d  bv a  Stronp  leva  lbation  - nl. there  was  a  sharlp
c('ntLa~t,  in  t  effe'tient'  t  t  i-  tLa'.lY  L-rime  between  the  I>L-r-fornm
peri:l  1>'---  and  tho  p\'1ct-L-t(-rm Tperil  1?7S-87).  This  helped  us  to
idntitiv  k-;  hanzes  in  the  trade  rDPim-  Third.  the  tact  that  thD capital
ar  cunt  in  'he  bal1.nc,  -f  paavmentz  r-main-el  irtuallv  closed  to  private
Lanqa  - ttj n- all)  ei uc .j'  'r3  th-  r1ol  1f th-  domestic  financial  market
in  L-lation  t('  trade  libeLalizati-n-.  F"  t  -rale  lileralization  occurrod
at  he  came  t ime  that  the  Sri  Lank.an  lr  vrnmlm  3erep-ulat-d  the  interest
cv  *@'-.  t  I'i.  ld diLre-ted  "1dit  ,  al',,  1".@d  :il:  1ankS  to  enter  the  domestit
+''S,  '9.  .;  Thu,;  tbl-  ;hif! tlvmm  r  a  1uhlv  reprssed  financial  regime25
to a less repressed system enabled us to identify changes in the domestic
financial  market.  Finally, the reliable and adequate data needed to
perform econometric tests on the hypothese! suggested by the analytical
framework  was available.
The Empirical Evidence
Empirical analysis of trade liberalization and financial  market reform
yielded a number of interesting results.
First, as described above, trade liberalization is facilitated  when
financial intermediation becomes more extensive.  More institutional credit
becomes available to finance the desired fxpansion  of the tradable sector.
In Sri Lanka, the M3/GDP ratio rose from 29% in the 1970-77 period to 34Z
in the 1980-87 period.  The Ml/GDP ratio declined after 1977, indicating a
shift from cash to savings and time deposits in household asset portfolios.
Econometric tests (using an OLS regression model) confirm a positive
relationship between time and savings deposits and the interest rates paid
on such deposits.  Similarly, a negative relationship  was found between
interest rates and real cash holdings.  For example, a one percent increase
in savings and time deposits was associated  with an 8% decline in real cash
holdings and a 4.2Z increase in the real interest rates paid on the
deposits.  The regressions also indicated a wealth effect.  A one percent
increase in real GDP was associated with a 1.5% increase in savings and
time deposits.  As hypothesized, a nonrepressed financial system led to a
higher rate of domestic asset accumulation.  That helped the trade
liberalization by increasing the availability of institutional credit.
Second, there was also ample evidence to show that private savings
responded positively to the increased real interest rates.  There was an
impressive improvement in the ratio of private savings to private income,
from 14.4Z in the 1970-76 period to 20.2Z in the 1977-84 period.  This
increase in private savings can be interpreted as the response to a change
in permanent income and the real interest rate.  Econometric estimates
suggest an interest elasticity of 0.98% and an income elasticity of 1.22%
for private savings.  These results stand in contrast to the earlier work
of others, which found no relationship between total domestic savings and
interest rates.  This is not surprising, since  public sector savings are
seldom correlated with interest rate changes.  Besides, the large inflows
of foreign capital to the public sector following the 1977 reforms implied
negative public savings.  Thus, to the extent that savings responded to
interest rates, more noninflationary finance  was available for investment.
Third, a relationship exists between the trade reform and the domestic
financial market through the real exchans£e  rate.  To the extent that
households increased their demancd  for dnmesti' financial assets *ather than
nontradables because of the increase in income from trade liberalization.
appreciation of the real exchange rate  was retarded.  Thus, in the ahsence
of attractive domestic financial asspts and reqtrictions on holding foreign
assets, the exchange rate would appreciat9  more.  Evidence from the
Consumer  Finance  and  Socioee  onomif  SurveV  in  Sti  Lanka  indicates  that
household  portfolios  did  shitt towaLd  h,ank  dep-  its,  the  most  attractive
financial  asset  at  the  time,  the  shari  otf  Ianl:  leposits  in  household  asset
portfolios  rising  from  a  historical  ratio  of  1s17  to  3.° in  1981-82.26
Econometric tests were performed to investigate the cumulative effect of
financial deepening on the real exchange rate.  A regression  model was
estimated with the real exchange rate as the dependent variable: the model
used the financial intermediation ratio and a number of other explanatory
variables.  The results indicate that the financial intermediation ratio
was a highlv significant deterrninant  of the real exchange rate and showed
the expected sign for the postreform period.  The tests, however, failed to
show such a relationship during the pre-reform period.  This is perhaps to
be  expected, given that the real exchange rate could have been contaminated
by the presence of import quotas.  Moreover, the financial intermediation
ratio remained low and constant over a long period up to 1977, reflecting a
high degree of financial repression.
The other variables used in the regression  model, such as the exchange
rate premium, government expenditures and terms of trade variations seem to
have controlled the real exchange rate in the prereform period.  Thus, the
evidence confirmed the hypothesis that in the absence of financial reform,
the 1977 trade liberalization  would have been thwarted by an earlier and
larger appreciation of the exchange rate.  Financial reform helped to
maintain the competitiveness gained from trade liberalization by providing
attractive financial assets as an alternative to the purchase of
nontradables.
Fourth, following the financial reform and the resulting rise in the
financial intermediation ratio, real credit to the private sector increased
threefold during the 1977-85 period.  Given that the private sector
produces and consumes relatively  more tradables than the public sector,
this  may also have helped to delay appreciation of the exchange rate.  This
is because increased expenditure on tradables has no impact on the real
exchange rate.  Moreover, with the increase in real credit, private fixed
investment rose from 8.5Z of GDP in the early 1970s to 182 in 1978-82.
Regression results showed the elasticity of private direct investment with
respect to real loanable funds to be 0.63% in the short term and 2.17Z in
the long run.  Private investment in thie  tradable sectors became more
profitable after the trade liberalization, and this investment in turn  was
facilitated by the financial sector reforms that increased the availability
of real loanable funds.
Finally, as indicated in the theoretical framework, an interest
determined credit allocation enhances the shift of resources to the
tradable sector following a trade liberalization and improve resource
allocation.  Conversely, the presence of directed credit in a repressed
financial system stands in the  way of credit flows to finance the expansion
of the tradable sector.  To the extent that directed credit would have
favored large firms producinR for the domestic market under a repressed
financial Fvstem, increases in the alloeation of  credit to small-scale
enterprises would provide some support for the view that credit allocation
improved following the reforms.  Following the financial reforms, the
amount of credit flowing to sml31 enterprises in Sri Lanka doubled between
1977  and  1986.  However.  evidence  for  impro)ved  credit  allocation  because  of
the  dispersion  of  interest, rates remains  amliguous.  The  dispersion  of
intpr-t  rates increased(  following th-  ttadle  and  financial sector reforms.
?ntraiv  to  what  is predict-  ly thI'  r-.  But  -- me  factors  could  help  to
expl.ir,  the  increased dispersion.  The  financial market reform  may have27
given  risky  borrowers  a better  opportunity  to obtain  credit. On the  other
hand,  the  Central  Bank  continued  to  maintain  differential  discount  rates
and  to subsidize  credit  for  some  purposes. This  in turn  tended  to impede
the  competitiveness  of the  tradable  sector  gained  through  the  1977  trade
liberalization.28
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Data Appendix
The data series used in this study, unless otherwise stated in the text
and notes to tables, have been directly obtained or compiled from the
following publications of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka:
1.  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
. Annual Report of the Monetary Board (to  the Minister of Finance)
3.  Review of the Economy
Data on the organized financial sector is commonly considered as the
most reliable of national economic statistics of Sri Lanka.
In the selection and transformation of most of the required data
series, we h;."e  simply followed established practices in this field of
research..  However, the choice of the price index for  measuring the real
return of money, real income variable and the construction of gross
domescic saving series need some explanatic.'.
McKinnon (1973:  96-7; 1989:  35) has forcefully argued that, in
measuring the real return on money, the wholesale price index (WPI),  which
represents claims on a broad basket ot tradable goods, is a better deflator
than the consumer price index (CPI),  which has a large service component.
Tangible goods including inventories of commodities of all kinds is the
principal alternative asset open to savers, which may be either
substitutable or complementary to real money balances.  Pure services
cannot he "held" in asset portfolios; even households that save  with the
ultimate intention of consuming services in the distant future  must hold
those savings in the form of either goods or financial assets.
The WPI of Sri Lanka (compiled by the Central Bank) dates only from
1974 and, therefore, does not cover the full sample period used for the
empirical analysis of this study.  We therefore choose to use the implicit
deflator for the commodity production sectors of the economy derived from
national accounts as our price index.  This is the best available indicator
of tradable-goods prices covering the whole sample period.
The aggregate income  variable we used is GDP as measured from the
expenditure slde.  For the period since about 1982 there is a considerable
and widening  (arid  yet unexplained) difference between the GDP series
derived from the expenditure side and that derived from the production
side.  We use the former series because there are reasons to suspect that
the latter  may have overstated the level of economic activity (Jayawardena
et al 1987:4).  As a part of a major revision into national accounts
(following the trade liberalization ref(rms, in  1978.  estimates dating back
to 1970  were adjusted for exchange rat- changeq and changes in subsidized
prices of  (crtain commodities (sep  Cventral  Bank. Review of the Economy-
-1978.  p-.  12-23  for details).  We  adjuststd  the national expenditure series
Ia  ak  to  19609  foIllowing  the  same  pro-dur-
Tn the  ab-encp  of dirp-t  -stimatq  ,  wo  Pstimated  gross domestic savings
iw  zu1,tra-tinv  foreeign  saving  (p1-rxi-.d  i^.  the lalance  in  the  goods  and
-tvi,  - a'  (un  in  the  LbaIa  i)  -P  ,t  p'avm1rnt 4  ttm  gross  domestic
invec.ment..  A  major  limitation  involved  in  this  procedure is that35
inaccuracies  in  either  series  may lead  to  measurement  errors  in the  saving
estimate. However,  if the  biases  are  consistent  over  time  and  the  errors
are  random,  the  use  of this  series  in  the  analysis  of saving  behavior  need
not  necessarily  yield  misleading  results. In any  case,  the  gross  domestic
savings  series  is  not  central  to the  empirical  analysis  of this  study.Table 1
Distribution of Bank Branches and Deposits
1965  1970  1977  1979  1981  1984
Sri Lankan Banksa
a.  number of branches  81  152  707  779  915  623
b.  share of total depositsb  66  76  88  89  84  77
(56)  (72)  (82)  (81)  (72)  (68)
Foreign Banksc
a.  number of branches  16  13  8  11  21  25
(13)  (15)
b.  share of total deposits  34  24  12  11  16  23
(9)  (13)
Total
a.  number of branches  97  165  715  810  936  648
b.  total deposits (Rs.  Mn.)  1,564  2,394  6,793  2,343  21,403  39,938
Notes:  a.  Excluding  Agricultural Service Centre branches.
b.  Total deposit share of state-owned  banks in parentheses.
c.  Figures in parentheses relate to banks established after  1976.
Source:  Central Bank, Annual Report and Review of the Economy (various  issues)Table 2
Financial Market  Institutions:  Percentage Distribution  of Assets
1965  1970  1977  1981  1984
1.  Commercial Banksa  48.7  51.5  58.8  62.4  57.3
2.  Other Deposit Taking Institutions  18.4  21.5  17.8  16.4  21.7
FCBUs  - - - 3.1  4.6
National Savings Bank  18.4  19.3  16.0  1].6  13.0
Finance Companiesb  n.a.  2.2  1.9  1.7  3.7
3.  Development  Finance Institutions  2.8  1.3  3.1  3.1
National Development  BankC  - - - 0.4  0.6
Development  Finance Corporation  0.8  1.0  0.7  1.9  1.7
4.  Nonbank Financial  Institutions  29.2  24.2  22.1  18.1  18.3
State-owned provident  funds  18.9  17.6  15.2  12.2  12.4
State-owned  insurance companies  0.9  1.2  2.3  1.98  1.2
5.  Total  100  100  100  100  100
(Rs. Million)  3,718  6,112  17,217  50,598  95,901
Notes:  a.  Excluding  Foreign Currency Banking Units  (FCBUs).
b.  This figure relates to only those companies which  report their assets  to the
Central Banks.
c.  Figures  for 1965 and 1970 show the combined  deposits of Post Office Savings Bank,
Ceylon  Savings Bank and the Savings Certificate  Fund which were  amsalgamated  in 1973
to form the NSB.
Source:  Khatkhate  (1980) supplemented with various issues of Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics.38
Table 3
Real Exchange Rate Indexa, 1965-83
(1980-100)
Exportables
Total  Non-traditional  Importables
1 96 5 - 69 b  48  29
1970 75 b  52  48
76  66  62
77  82  81  72
78  94  80  84
79  97  84  91
80  100  100  100
81  95  100  98
82  85  81  95
83  86  78  99
Notes:  a.  Export/import unit value index in rupees (adjusted for trade
taxes and subsidies) deflated by the implicit  GDP deflator for
nontradable (construction  and services) sectors.
b.  Not available
c.  Annual averages
Source:  Cuthbertson and Athukorala (1988)39
Table 4
Interest Rates, 1965-87
Commercial Bank  Commercial Bank
NSB Deposit Rate  Deposit Rate  Lending Rate
1965-70  3.7 (-  2.4)  3.7 (-  2.4)  9.0 (-  2.9)
1971-76  7.2 (-  8.4)  5.0 (-  11.1)  8.5 (-  7.1)
1977-83  14.9 (1.3)  13.8 (0.2)  16.3 (2.5)
1984-87  14.2 (5.2)  9.8 (0.1)  20.2 (12.9)
1977  11.1 (8.1)  10.6 (7.7)  11.3 (8.4)
1978  12.6 (2.3)  11.4 (1.1)  12.8 (1.5)
1979  12.1 (-  5.1)  11.8 (-  5.3)  13.8 (-  3.2)
1980  17.0 (2.3)  17.5 (2.9)  17.2 (2.6)
1981  17.2 (0.3)  17.8 (1.0)  8.4 (1.6)
1982  17.8 (-  5.1)  13.6 (-  9.3)  20.0 (-  2.9)
1983  16.5 (5.1)  14.1 (2.7)  20.6 (9.2)
1984  16.7 (4.6)  12.6 (0.5)  20.5 (8.4)
1985  14.3 (3.3)  11.2 (0.2)  20.1 (9.1)
1986  12.8 (8.1)  7.5 (0.3)  20.3 (13.1)
1987  12.8 (4.8)  7.4 (-  0.5)  19.8 (11.9)
Notes:  a.  In each column, the first figure indicates the nominal rate and
the second (bracketed) figure the real rate.  Deposit rate is
the weighted average of savings deposit and 1-year fixed deposit
rates.  Lending rate is the  weighted average rates of loans
classified by securities.  Real rate is the difference between
the current nominal rate and the inflation rate as measured by
the GDP deflator (non-services)  for the previous year.
b.  Annual average
Source:  Columns 1 and 2:  compiled using data from Central Bank, Review of
the Economy.  Column 3, Central Bank, Bulletin.40
Table 5
Gross Domestic Product:  Sectoral Composition and Growth Ratesa
at Constant (1970) Factor Costs (annual averages), 1970-85
1970-77  1980-83  1984-85
Sector
Primary products  36.6  24.8  28.2
(2.1)  (4.1)  (4.8)
export agricultureb  17.0  10.2  9.3
(-1.7)  (0.5)  (1.3)
domestic agriculture  17.5  11.8  14.7
(3.5)  (5.3)  (9.5)
Industry  16.5  19.0  21.2
(1.0)  (4.2)
construction  4.9  4.8  5.8
C- 2.6)  (8.8)  (1.3)
manufacturingc  9.1  9.7  12.2
(2.3)  (6.4)  (7.8)
Services  46.7  56.2  50.6
(3.7)  (7.2)  (5.5)
Total GDP  100  100  100
(2.9)  (6.0)  (5.1)
Source:  Central Bank, Review of the Economy (various issues).41
Table 6
The Behavior of the Financial Sector:
Selected Indicators, 1960-87
M1*  M2*  M3*  Ml/GDP  M2/GDP  M3/GDP
1980-100  1980-100  1980-100  2  Z  2
1960  61  37  37  17  22  29
1965  87  55  53  20  26  33
1970  83  65  62  14  22  29
1975  59  43  47  12  17  25
1977  69  54  55  15  24  32
1978  82  71  73  14  26  34
1979  94  87  89  15  29  38
1980  100  100  100  14  30  38
1981  96  109  108  12  31  40
1982  107  131  133  12  31  40
1983  116  137  141  12  31  40
1984  113  138  145  10  28  38
1985  127  154  165  12  30  41
1986  136  154  168  12  28  40
1987  146  161  174  13  30  41
*  At constant (1980)  prices
Source and method of compilation:  see Data Appendix42
Table 7
Demand for Financial Assets:  Regression Results, 1960-1987
Ml  STD
Constant  2.74*  - 3.39**
(7.29)  (2.78)
GDP  0.45**  1.55**
(4.71)  (4.59)
(1 +  RSTD)  - 2.08**  6.13*
(2.45)  (2.23)
D*(1 +  RSTD)  1.32  -1.99
(1.79)  (0.83)
(1 +  PE)  - 4.18**  5.84
(3.69)  (1.59)
D*(1 +  PE)  2.65**  -0.45
(3.14)  (0.16)
Test Statistics
Rx2  0.77  0.84
F  18.43  30.22
DW  1.61  1.60
LM  2.21#  0.73#
RESET2  0.88#  3.46tt
JB  1.54#  0.851
WH  0.081  0.15#
Variables:  Ml =  currency and demand deposits (real)  held by the non-bank
private sector; STD =  savings and time deposits (real)  held by the
non-bank private sector; GDP =  real GDP; RITP =  weighted average
real interest rate on savings and time deposits; PE =  rate of
inflation  with a one-year lag; D =  trade liberalization dummy (1
for 1978-87 and zero for other years)
Notes:  t- ratios of coefficients are given in parentheses with the level
of significance denoted as, **  =  significant at the one percent
level, and *  =  significant at the five percent level.
LM  Lagrange multiplier test of seriel correlation, F version.
RESET2  Ramsey's RESET test for functional form  misspecification using thp
square of the fitted values. F version.
JB  Jarque-Bera test for the normality of residuals.
WH  White's heteroscedasticitv test. F version.
lNull  hypothesis is  not rejected at the five percent level.
#  Null hypothesis is  not rejected at the one percent level.
Data sources and the  methodology used irn  constructing the data series are
discussed in the Data Appendix.43
Table  8
Gross  Domestic  Saving,  1965-1984
TDS/GDP  PRS/GDP  PRS/YPR
(2)  (2)  (2)
1965-69  11.2  11.9  14.8
1970-76  13.6  12.5  14.4
1977  13.8  14.2  21.1
1978  15.2  16.5  23.4
1979  13.7  13.4  18.7
1980  11.1  14.8  22.7
1981  11.7  13.4  18.1
1982  11.8  12.2  18.1
1983  13.8  13.7  18.1
1984  19.9  16.1  21.4
TDS - gross  domestic  saving
PRS - gross  domestic  private  saving
YPR - private-sector  income  (proxied,  GDP +  (government  revenue  - transfers  to
private  sector  current  accounts)).
Source  and  method  of  compilation:  see  Data  Appendix44
Table 9
Composition of Net Assets of Households, 1973, 1978/79 and 1981/82
(percentage shares of total)
1966/70  1972/73  1978/79  1981/82
Financial Assets  23.8  29.4  34.2  54.3
Bank depositsa  9.6  9.3  5.7  33.2
Other claimsb  15.2  20.1  28.4  21.1
Physical Assets  76.2  70.4  65.8  45.7
Land and buildings  49.2  46.5  34.5  27.4
Business and industrial
venturesc  27.0  23.9  31.3  18.3
100  100  100  100
Notes: a.  Does not include current account balances, but includes government
bonds, securities and shares.  In 1981/82 the latter three items
together accounted for less than one percent of total financial
assets.
b.  Contributions to provident funds, loans given and contributions to
informal saving schemes (Cheetus).
c.  Including purchase of machinery and equipment and business
vehicles.
Source:  Saito (1976) (estimates for 1966/70) and Central Bank, Consumer
Finance and Socio-economic Survey, 1973, 1978-79 and 1981-2.45
Table  10
Determinants of Real Exchange Rate (RER):  Regression Results, 1970-1987
(1)  (2)
Constant  1.32  1.29
(5.67)  (5.46)
TOT  - 0.03
(0.32)
NFC  - 0.68  - 0.76*
(1.43)  (2.10)
GEXP  - 1.21*  - 1.26*
(2.10)  (2.37)
FIR  - 0.41  0.35
(1.40)  (0.63)
D*FIR  1.08**  1.09**
(3.45)  (3.67)
BMP  0.05  0.05
(1.01)  (1.21)
Test Statistics
R  0.69  0.57
F  9.41  6.58
DW  2.07  1.62
L.M  0.151  0.10
RESET2  1.681  2.42t
JB  0.141  0.121
WH  0.0041  0.0041
Variables:  TOT  terms of trade (1980  =  1.0)
NFC  net foreign capital inflow as a ratio of GNP
GEXP  total government expenditure as a ratio of gross national
expenditure
FIR  financial intermediation ratio (M3/GNP)
D*FIR  slope dummy for FIR where D takes 1 for 1978-87 and 0
otherwise
BMP  black market premium on the official exchange rate
Notes:  t-ratios of coefficients are given in parentheses with the level
of significance denoted as  **  =  one percent level and *  =  five
percent level.  For definitions of test statistics see Table 7.
Data sources and method of compilation of data series are explained in the
Data Appendix.46
Table 11
Total Credit Extended by Financial Institutions, 1977a-85
1977  1979  1981  1983  1985
1. Total Credit Rs. mnb  15361  25669  33990  43963  47798
1.1  Government, net (2)  49.1  40.7  33.0  32.5  32.0
1.2  Public Corporations (2)  13.4  15.1  12.3  7.3  6.0
1.3  Co-operatives (2)  10.0  8.7  3.5  3.1  1.8
1.4  Private Sector (2)  27.5  35.5  51.2  57.1  60.2
100  100  100  100  100
2. Credit to Government,
net, Rs. mb  7426  10465  11241  14331  15291
Commercial Banks (2)  0.7  -2.3  0.5  -0.9  -1.9
National Savings Bank (2)  40.9  46.7  44.7  51.7  57.9
Employee Provident Fund (2)  40.7  43.1  46.2  45.8  56.7
Insurance Companies (2)  16.6  14.6  12.2  7.0  6.2
-1.1  -2.1  -3.6  -3.6  -16.9
Notes: a. Other than the Central Bank.
b. At 1980 prices.
Source:  Central Bank, Review of the Economy, (various issues).Table  12
Commercial  Bank  Lendinga,  1970-85
1970  1975  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982,  1%3  1S85
Total  loans  6226  6341  7222  11491  13769  17136  18916  21780  23273  '2221  2176




Tradable  40.0  36.5  40.6  43.1  40.7  35.6  35.2  36.6  067  i.8  .0
Sectors
Agriculture  13.1  14.1  17.2  16.0  14.8  13.2  13.2  12.1  1  .'
Industryc  26.9  22.4  23.4  27.1  25.9  22.4  22.0  24.5  27..
(21 6)  (18.6)  (21.1)  (24.3)  (22.3)  (18.4)  (17.6)  (19.3)  .7  1




Short  Term  58.9  74.6  77.5  74.0  75.0  70.2  68.4  68.9  71.0  72.2  70.6
Medium Term  28.7  19.3  16.5  20.4  19.4  21.2  20.4  22.2  20.4  18.6  19.4
Long  Term  12.3  6.1  6.0  5.5  5.6  8.6  10.2  8.9  8.6  9.2  10.0
Notes:  a.  Loans  to  private  sector  and  public  corporations
b. at 1980 prices
c. percentage  of loans  to manufacturing  (ISIC 3) are  given  in parenthesis.
d.  Sum  of  loans  for  commercial,  financial,  housing  and  consumption.
Source: Central bank, Monthly Bulletins of Statistics (various  issues)48
Table 13
Medium and Long Term Credit Extended by
Commercial Banks and Development Finance Institutions (DFI)
DFI Share
Total Loans*  in total (2)
Rs. mn  Index
1980=100
1970  2979  52  9.6
1975  1885  33  18.6
1977  1967  34  15.4
1978  3477  61  11.5
1979  4125  72  15.5
1980  5727  100  10.7
1981  7012  122  13.9
1982  7551  132  16.2
1983  8249  144  15.9
1984  7935  139  19.7
1985  9636  168  22.6
Notes:  *At 1980 prices.
Source:  Central Bank, Monthly bulletin of Statistics, (various issues).49
Table 14
Commercial Bank Credit to Manufacturing by ISIC
Subdivisions, 1973-85 (percentage  distribution)*
1973  1977  1980  1983  1985
(1)  Food, beverages  2.7  4.4  9.5  8.9  7.5
and tobacco  (0.2)  (2.3)  (1.4)  (2.4)  (0.3)
(2)  Textiles  18.2  25.5  25.8  28.9  29.3
(4.5)  (11.9)  (13.3)  (2.7)  (10.5)
(3)  Wearing apparel  5.8  5.8  15.1  3.7  4.5
and leather  (1.5)  (0.3)  (1.1)  (0.7)  (1.4)
(4)  Wood and wood  2.9  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.4
products  (2.4)  (0.2)  (0.1)  ( - )  (0.5)
(5)  Paper and paper  5.1  3.3  3.1  2.8  3.9
products  (3.6)  (1.7)  (0-9)  (0.2)  ( -)
(6)  Rubber and plastic  4.7  1.8  4.6  3.9  4.3
products  (0.5)  ( - )  (0-1)  ( - )  -)
(7)  Chemical, petroleum  8.7  32.7  6.3  5.6  5.4
and coal  (4.0)  (31.1)  (2.7)  (0.4)  (1.5)
(8)  Non-metallic mineral 1.1  3.1  3.7  5.4  3.7
products  (0.1)  (1.3)  (1.8)  (2.6)  (2.4)
(9)  Basic metal  6.0  7.1  8.0  7.1  3.4
products  (3.2)  (5.3)  (3.1)  (2.0)  (1.6)
(10) Fabricated metal
products, machinery  3.4  2.2  6.0  2.2  2.3
and transport  (0.9)  ( - )  (1.3)  (0.1)  (  -
equipment
(11)  Other  41.2  13.3  17.1  30.9  34.2
(25.1  (1.9)  (2.2)  (18.4)  (13.7)
Total (Rs.  mn)  390  1253  3163  6509  7239
(481)  (700)  (890)  (1930)  (1738)
Public-sector share  46.1  55.9  28.1  29.7  24.0
in total credit
Notes-  *  Figures in parentheses relate to credit to public-sector
manufacturing ventures.
- Denotes figures less than 0.05.
Source:  Compiled using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Monthl.y  Bulletin
(various issues).50
Table 15
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation
TFC*  PFCwTFC  /GDP  PFC/GDPPFC/  YPR
(1980=100)(1980=100)
1965-69  '9  37  14.1  7.4  9.5
107111t--76  45  62  15.S  8.6  10.2
1Q77  29  46  13.8  7.2  8.5
1079  43  52  19.9  8.9  12.6
1970  73  92  25.2  13.1  18.4
198')  100  100  31.2  13.7  21.0
1981  101  113  27.3  13.0  17.5
1982  126  145  31.9  14.7  20.0
1983  125  n.a.  31.0  n.a.  n.a.
1984  120  n.a.  28.3  n.a.  n.a.
1985  118  n.a.  25.9  n.a.  n.a.
1986  123  n.a.  25.8  n.a.  n.a.
1987  121  n.a.  25.2  n.a.  n.a.
*  at 1980  prices.
TFC  gross domestic fixed capital formation.
PFC  private-sector gross fixed capital formation.
YPR  private-sector income (as  defined in Table 8).
Source and Method of Compilation:  see Data appendix.51
Table 16
Return on Capital in the Private Corporate Sector, 1974-83a
Firm Typeb  1974-77  1978/79  1979/80  1980/81  1981/82  1982/83
1.  Manufacturing(14)  28.4  74.4  31.3  33.4  26.4  28.1
1.1 Import-substituting(10) 21.0  79.8  56.8  48.4  40.3  32.4
1.2 Export-oriented(4)C  32.5  47.7  20.8  24.2  22.1  14.7
2.  Trading(10)  7.2  48.5  39.5  48.7  52.6  57.3
3.  Tourist Hotels and
Travel(5)  12.0  48.8  33.3  28.7  24.6  23.2
4.  Total sample(29)  19.3  56.6  34.4  30.9  29.1  25.8
Notes:  a.  Return on capital is measured as the ratio of pre-tax profits to
total estimates related.  29 public limited liability companies
are representiative of large corporate sector only.
b.  Number of firms included in each category are shown in brackets.
c.  Firms  with an export share in turnover of more than 50 percent or
more.  Data for 1974-77 and 1978/79 relate to two firms only.
Source:  Compiled using data from Colombo Brokers Association, Hand Book of
Rupee Companies,Colombo (various issues).52
Table 17
Distribution of Household Borrowing by
Purpose and Source (Z), 1973, 1978/9 and 1981/82a
Purpose of Borruwing  Informal (curb  market) Sources
FLL.ancial  Money  Other, with  Without
Institutions  Lenders  interestc  interestd  Total
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Agricultural  1973  - - - 100
( )  (-)  ~~~(21.7)
1978/9  61.5  21.3  1.8  15.4  100
(29.4)  (12.88  (0.7)  (7.2)  (12.1)
1981/2  61.2  22.2  5.2  11.4  100
(28.1)  (19.7)  (8.0)  (7.7)  (18.5)
Industrial  1973  - - -
1978/9  55.6  8.2  4.5  31.7  100
(1.9)  (2.8)  (0.3)  (4.6)  (1.9)
1981/2  82.8  8.7  0.8  7.7  100
(24.8)  (5.0)  (1.2)  (3.4)  (12.1)
Houring  1973  - _
1978/9  48.8  31.3  9.8  10.1  100
(44.9)  (36.3)  (7.9)  (9.1)  (23.2)
1981/2  45.5  15.5  14.7  24.3  100
(13.6)  (9.0)  (14.8)  (10.9)  (12.2)
Trade  1973  - - -
- - - - (8.5)
1978/9  15.2  33.5  4.0  47.3  100
(2.3)  (6.4)  (0.5)  (7.1)  (3.9)
1981/2  37.8  22.8  8.7  30.7  100
(11.8)  (15.1)  (9.9)  (15.7)  (13.7)
Otherb  1973  - - - 100
(-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  ~~~~~~(67.7)
1978/9  9.1  24.8  44.5  11.6  100
(21.5)  (41.7)  (90.6)  (72.0)  (58.9)
1981/2  4.1  50.2  37.8  7.9  100
(21.7)  (51.2)  (66.1)  (62.3)  (43.5)
Total  1973  20.2  37.3  13.0  29.4  100
(-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  ~~~~~(100)
1978/9  25.3  20.1  29.1  25.5  100
(100)  (100)  (10()  (100)  (100)
1981/2  40.1  20.8  1Z.1  27.0  100
(100.0)  (100)  (10'))  (100)  (100)53
Table 17 continued
Notes:  a  Non-bracketed figures relate to percentage distribution of loans
by source.  Percentage distribution by purpose is shown by the
bracketed figures.  "  - "  denotes figures  which are not available.
b  Borrowing for consumption, ceremonies, settlement of debt and
other unclassified borrowings.
c  Mainly from boutiques, and employers.
d  Mainly from friends and relatives.
e  Includes housing loans.
Source: Compiled from Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey of Sri Lanka's Consumer
Finances 1973 (Part  II), and Report on Consumer Finances and
Socioeconomic Survey 1978/79 and 1981/82 (Part II).54
Table 18
Institutional Lending Rates (Z)
Commercial Banks  DFCb  NDBC
Secured  Unsecured
loansa  loans
1970  6.5-12  8.5-12  9.5-12  --
1975  8.5-12  9.5-14  9.5-12.5  --
1976  8.5-14  9.5-14  9.5-12.5  --
1977  13.0-19  18.0-20  9.5-13  --
1978  13.0-19  18.0-21  10.5-16  --
1979  13.0-19  18.0-21  10.5-17  10-12
1980  13.0-28  19.0-30  13.0-17  10-17
1981  13.0-28  19.0-32  12.0-17  10-17
1982  16.0-30  14.0-30  11.0-14  10-17
1983  18.0-28  11.0-33  11.0-14  9-14
1984  16.0-30  14.0-33  11.0-14  7-14
1985  11.0-30  13.0-30  14.0-21  7-14
1986  12.0-30  10.0-30  14.3-28  7-14
Notes: a.  These rates relates to loans secured by immoveable property.
Lending rate for loans based on other types of securites show a
similar pattern.
b.  Development Finance Corporation.
c.  National Development Bank.
Source:  Central Bank, Review of the Economy (various issues).55
Table 19
Household Borrowing by Source and Rate of Interest
Ra e of Interest  Institutional sources  Informal sources  Total
per annum
Other
Money  lenders Total
o  0  0  70.5  44.9  27.8
.1-10  9.0  1.4  3.1  2.5  4.9
11-20  22.2  4.1  23.6  16.5  18.7
21-30  40.5  16.0  1.5  6.8  19.6
31-40  24.8  4.2  0.2  1.7  20.5
41-50  0.2  3.4  0  1.2  0.8
51-60  3.3  5.1  0.5  2.2  1.2
61-100  0  6.2  0.3  2.5  1.6
over 101  0  59.6  0.3  21.7  14.9
100  100  100  100  100
Source:  Central Bank, Report on Consumer Finances and Socioeconomic Survey
1981/82, Part 1 Colombo, Table 7.18.PRE Workinn Pager Series
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